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Suspension, Hu(wo)man Rights and Tor ts;
Discr iminator y Religious Pr actices and
Hu(wo)man Rights Suspension Tactics in
Remedying Feminine Suffer ing thr ough Tor t Law
Yifat Bitton*
ABSTRACT
What role does suspension tactics have in resolving highly contested
social and political issues concerning hu(wo)man rights? When applied in
the law and religion context, this question carries a special resonance in
societies where religious law forms part of the civil legal system, as is the
case in Israel. The following article explores the Israeli judicial involvement
in alleviating the suffering women experience on account of religious rules
and practices, as my argument pertains to the application of suspension
tactics and tort claims with a view to protecting hu(wo)man rights. The
article considers the intersection of tort law and religious practices as
critically encouraging such tactics. While it recognizes the importance of
the newly acknowledged potential of tort law to diminish discrimination
against women, the article also cautions against the reality in which courts
use these very same claims as a means for suspending women’s right to
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Associate professor, The College of Management Striks Law School, Israel. Ph.D. The
Hebrew University and LLM, Yale University Law School. Co-founder and chair of
Tmura, The Israeli Anti- discrimination Legal Centre. I wish to thank the participants of
I-CONS Conference in NY (2015) and The Association for Sociology of Religion
Conference in SF (2014) for their insights following my presentations. Jacob Flex’s
exceptional editing and research assistance was invaluable to me as well I also take this
opportunity to explain the word “hu(wo)man” in the article. Choosing this non-existing
word is purposeful. Notwithstanding the fact that using the phrase “women’s rights”
would have been the correct choice of words here, grammar wise, my wording
nevertheless expresses feminist discomfort with the demarcation of these rights as
relevant to women only, whereas they should be of concern to humans as a whole.
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equality. The article further seeks to identify the mechanisms, which seem
to evolve this opposite effect, whereby courts suspend women’s right to
equality in contexts involving tort claims alleging religiously-grounded
harms. This pursuit is applied in the analysis of several recent cases in
which the Supreme Court of Israel and the Grand (national) Rabbinical
Court have both addressed the issue. These cases regarded women’s
entitlement to pursue their right to equality through tortious claims, to
which the courts responded by instructing the women how to exercise their
tortious rights. In what might seem to be conflicting decisions, both courts
used the association between the law of torts and women’s equality to
suspend the latter and thus excluded women from equal protection of the
law. The courts’ recent penchant for instructing women embodies a
dangerous legal position, which suggests that tortious claims must be used
instead of other viable claims for equality, resulting in a de facto suspension
of women’s rights.
The present article seeks to challenge the elusive disposition which
places tort law at the forefront of women’s fight for equality, but ultimately
serves to marginalize it. To this end, the author uses a novel feminist
application of Giorgio Agamben’s theoretical work, introducing the terms
“state of exception” and “suspension” to conceptualize and illustrate a
current evolutional legal stage, which renders illegal the suspension of
rights that women endure under such “state of exception.” Finally, the
article seeks to re-advocate tort law’s central role in the betterment of
women’s underprivileged status in society by calling for a reorientation of
tortious rights as independent of and complementary to other legal
apparatuses designed to protect women’s right to equality.
Key words anti-discrimination torts, sex-based discrimination, women’s
rights, Giorgio Agamben.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Discriminatory religious rules and practices affect women worldwide. 1
Their influence goes far beyond their intended community of religious
women and “religious” legal systems.2 When woven into the legal system,
religious rules affect non-religious women, and legal systems do not
necessarily need to be grounded in religion to implement religious rules.3
Liberal legal systems that espouse the separation of religion and state may
also be involved in discriminatory religious practices, albeit indirectly. 4
Throughout the world, a Jewish woman who marries a Jewish man is
subject to her country’s secular legal system, as well as to the Jewish law in
matters concerning divorce and marriage.
6

5

This duality may work

7

concurrently, independently, or in a consolidated fashion. 8 Providing
1

See Noya Rimalt, Separation between Males and Females as Gender Based
Discrimination, 3 ALEI MISHPAT 99, 131 (2003). I prefer the use of the term “practice”
rather than “rule” to emphasize the idea that many alleged religious rules are actually
extremely patriarchal interpretations of Halakhic rules, and are therefore practices of
these rules. Halakhic rules are the collective body of ancient Jewish religious laws.
2
Gila Stopler, Note, Countenancing the Oppression of Women: How Liberals Tolerate
Religious and Cultural Practices that Discriminate Against Women, 12 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 154, 164 (2003).
3
Id. at 170.
4
Id.
5
See RUTH HALPERIN-KADDARI, WOMEN IN ISRAEL: A STATE OF THEIR OWN 227-62
(2003).
6
Esther Tager, The Chained Wife, 17 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 425, 437 (1999). In the U.S.,
divorce is generally a state matter, and requiring a Jewish husband to grant a divorce (get)
in particular is considered a religious matter to be settled by a Jewish religious court
regardless of civil divorce procedures. Id. In spite of this, the majority of pertinent
jurisprudence in the state of New York operates under the provisions of the Removal of
Barriers to Remarriage statute enacted on August 8, 1983 (also known as the New York
get Law). See N.Y. DOM. REL. § 243 (1984). This law requires both parties to state or
affirm that they have removed all barriers to the other party's ability to remarry, and thus
allowing New York courts to prevent a civil divorce until all religious barriers have been
removed. See Tager, supra, at 445 (for further analysis).
7
See Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] Dareinté 1877 S.
Jur. I 27 (Fr.) (where a Jewish husband was first compelled to grant his wife a religious
divorce (get), stating that she had suffered an inexcusable deprivation of her liberty to
marry, and thus accruing harm to her freedom of conscience. The court further ruled that
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women with a medium for addressing the consequential harm of
discriminatory religious rules is therefore highly significant in advancing
the global quest for gender equality, and in alleviating the costs that this
harm imposes on women.
Despite this crucial need, history suggests that traditional endeavors in
both the legal and political spheres have failed to provide sufficient
protection to women affected by religious rules.9 As a result, a group of
Israeli feminist legal scholars and human rights lawyers recently developed
a method of protecting women against gender-based suffering by applying a
cutting-edge interpretation of tort law theory and practice.

10

More

specifically, these scholars and practitioners have formulated theoretical and
doctrinal venues for the pursuit of this empowering process. 11 Feminist
legal scholars maintain that tort law may potentially redress, and ultimately
abolish, the “public” harm imposed by public state law and suffered by
women as a result of discriminatory religious rules, despite tort law’s
“private” nature as a branch of law.12
Religious law and tort law have, in the past, intersected in three main
types of cases: (1) tort claims arising from the misuse of normally
acceptable religious rules; (2) cases where religious settings serve as venues
the granting of a divorce is of a civil character meant to protect a woman's liberties). See
generally H. Patrick Glenn, Where Heavens Meet: The Compelling of Religious Divorces,
28 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 15 (1980) (for further analysis).
8
Stopler, supra note 2, at 171.
9
See Frances Raday, Women's Human Rights: Dichotomy between Religion and
Secularism in Israel, 11 ISR. AFF. 78, 87 (2005).
10
See Yifat Bitton, Transformative Feminist Approach to Tort Law: Exposing,
Changing, Expanding—The Israeli Case, 25 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L. J. 221, 225 (2014)
(for details regarding these activists’ individuals and groups).
11
See David Bleich, Modern Day Agunot, A Personal Remedy, 4 JEWISH L. ANN. 167,
167–87 (1981); see also Susan Weiss, Israeli Divorce Law: The Maldistribution of
Power, Its Abuses, and the ‘Status’ of Jewish Women, in MEN AND WOMEN: GENDER,
JUDAISM AND DEMOCRACY 53 (Rachel Elior ed., 2004).
12
Yifat Bitton, Public Hierarchy – Private Harm: Negotiating Divorce within Judaism,
in (RE)INTERPRETATIONS: THE SHAPES OF JUSTICE IN WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE 61 (Laurel
S. Peterson & Lisa Dresdner eds., 2008).
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for inflicting harms on believers; 13 and (3) religious practices that become
injurious and actionable per se. This article will introduce a fourth and
much less known intersection of these laws.14
Sharing the sentiment that tort law can, and should, serve as a tool for
combatting discrimination, I will argue that tortious entitlements should be
used to promote and further protect hu(wo)man rights undermined by
religion. Tortious entitlements must not be suspended or be used for
suspension of wo(hu)man rights. In activating the novel feminist
mechanism of reading torts anew for the betterment of women, the notion of
tort law as an independent and complementary means for securing women’s
right to equality and autonomy alongside its function as an alternative to
other problematic legal settings should bind the courts. Such perception of
tort law will provide women the discretion to make strategic decisions with
regard to whether they should utilize tort law. Conversely, if this use of tort
law is misunderstood, tort claims for the betterment of women might turn
into a double-edged sword and work against women and the struggle for
securing their human rights.
Tort law also intersects with religion in ways that are more tenuous. For
example, religious practice can be a yardstick for reasonableness in the
determination of negligence.15
13
See generally Thomas F. Taylor, Clergy Malpractice: Avoiding Earthly Judgment, 5
BYU J. PUB. L. 119, 119–40 (1991); see generally Timothy D. Lytton, Clergy Sexual
Abuse Litigation: The Policymaking Role of Tort Law, 39 CONN. L. REV. 809, 809–895
(2007); see generally Emily C. Short, Torts: Praying for the Parish or Preying on the
Parish - Clergy Sexual Misconduct and the Tort of Clergy Malpractice, 57 OKLA. L.
REV. 183, 183 (2004) (for the important role torts have played in the fight against this
phenomenon).
14
An example of such a practice is “disciplinary actions” taken by the church and its
congregation against one of its members in the course of an alleged Christian
indoctrination that can be highly harmful to this member. See, e.g., Church Liability for
Torts, LAW & CHURCH 1 (1989) (for an example of such a practice).
15
However, no systematic gender based characteristics were identified in the latter cases.
See, e.g., Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 320 A.2d 518, 519 ([N.J. Super.] 1974) (where
a minor plaintiff’s mother refused the administration of a blood transfusion due to her
beliefs as a member of Jehovah’s Witnesses).
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The identification of tort law’s suitability to the gender-equality battle
has led to an increasing interest in crafting a newly established and
thoughtfully structured practical use of tort law. 16 This perception of tort
law has, however, changed gradually in the past two decades in common
law systems that embraced the usage of tort law for the betterment of
women—to a point where this utilization no longer faces questioning and is
even considered natural.17 This strategic feminist move, as envisioned by
feminist scholars 18 and practiced by torts lawyers, was meant to achieve
three goals.
First, to compensate women for the harm inflicted upon them through
discriminatory religious practices with a potential for the imposition of tort
liability (as in the practices of Jewish men maliciously refusing a bill of
divorcement (hereinafter: get) or the coercive confinement of Jewish
women to segregated spaces in the public sphere, See infra).19
Second, after tortious liability becomes a real possibility, the inherent
deterrent effect tort law has on tortfeasors is expected to create large-scale
social change where the entities facilitating such harmful practices, rather
than the particular defendants, become economically motivated to avoid the
harmful practice and the system as a whole is “remedied.”
Third, in cases where religious authorities specifically are involved in
facilitating the harm, the imposition of tortious liability has the potential of
spurring these (exclusively male) authorities (i.e., rabbis) to reinterpret
discriminatory religious rules in a manner that would be less harmful to
women. In other words, the use of tortious claims to compensate women for
16

See Bitton, supra note 10, at 230.
See id. at 241 (for a description of the process); see also MARTHA CHAMALLAS &
JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 1–2
(2010) (for the legitimacy and justification of this view of tort law).
18
See Weiss, supra note 11, at 53; see generally Yifat Bitton, Reclaiming Power? Tort
Claims of Women Victims of Sexual Violence, in TRENDS AND ISSUES IN VICTIMOLOGY
130-50 (Natti Ronel et al. eds., 2008) (explores the envisioning of tort law as a means to
combat sexual violence against women).
19
Infra, on pp. 678-90 (segregation and Get oppression).
17
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the harmfulness of discriminatory religious rules has the potential to
encourage the revisiting of these rules from within the religious system, and
thus ensure relief to as many groups of women as possible. 20 This legal
paradigm suggests a path whereby feminist activism can establish a
dialogue with religion rather than its overall rejection, as is often
characteristic of the intersection of these cultural institutions.21 The cases
discussed in this article promulgate claims that alter fundamental
conservative accounts in current tort law that is rooted in a masculine
epistemological framework, whereby the suffering of women still mostly
remains unchallenged.22
Israel saw a period in which a growing number of tort cases have been
decided in favor of women who brought their grievances before Israeli civil
courts for sustained harms inflicted by religious practices. 23 Civil court
decisions from across the nation have only recently awarded compensation
to women plaintiffs seeking damages for discrimination by sex segregation
tactics used during burial ceremonies, on flights, and in buses.24 In light of
the success in these tort cases, the feminist mission of harnessing tort suits
to combat women’s discrimination has seemingly been accomplished. Or
has it?

20
As mentioned above, many women’s religious compliance do not necessarily emanate
from religious beliefs.
21
See Bitton, supra note 12, at 62.
22
See Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Tort Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L. REV.
575, 575-76 (1993) (for early writings on the topic); see FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
TORT LAW 1-13 (Janice Richardson & Erika Rackley eds., 2012) (for the second
generation of feminist critique of torts).
23
See Raday, supra note 9.
24
File No. 3342-03-12 Small Claims (Netanya), Rosit Davidian v. Chevra Kdisah
Kadisha (2012) (Isr.); File No. 19480/05 Kfar Sava Family Court, Jane Doe v. the Estate
of John Doe, (Isr.); File No. 30560/70 Rishon LeTzion Family Court, H.Sh v. H.A, (Isr.);
File No. 6743/02 Kfar Sava Family Court, K. v. K., (Isr.).
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Following a few prosperous years for Israeli women seeking redress for
their religious-based discrimination injuries, 25 recent years have seen the
emergence of alarming signs of retreat manifesting in the suspension of
women’s human rights entitlements. This retreat is particularly evident in
two legal contexts: family law and constitutional law. In the family law
context, prevalent are cases—to the extent they could be considered a
reformative trend—in which women sued their husbands for refusing to
grant a get, and the harm this refusal caused. 26 After years of trying the
divorce cases of women who simultaneously pursued tort suits and divorce
suits against their husbands, rabbinical courts have recently compelled
women employing both family and torts routes to relinquish their civil tort
suits.27 If the women refuse, they risk having their family law-based case
against their recalcitrant husbands suspended by the rabbinical court. 28
These women are thus in the impossible position of having to choose which
of their rights should be suspended: their human right to be freed from their
captive marriage or their legal right to exhaust a tort claim emanating from
their suffering as marriage-prisoner.
In the constitutional context, a covert version of either the suspension of a
human right in favor of a legal right to tort claim, or conversely, the
suspension of a right to tort claim in favor a human right is identifiable. In a
series of recent decisions, the Israel Supreme Court suspended the women’s
right to equality when infringed by religion.29 In the first decision, Regan v.
25

File No. 9101/00 Jerusalem Family Court, K.S. v. K.P, (Isr.) (for the most seminal
among a mounting number of such cases).
26
See John C. Kleefeld & Amanda Kennedy, ῾ A Delicate Necessity’: Burker v.
Marcovitz and the Problem of Jewish Divorce, 24 CAN. J. FAM. L. 205, 208 (2008) (for
the overview).
27
Rabbinical courts perceive any involvement in marriage and divorce issues as
wrongfully interfering with their exclusive jurisdiction over these matters, as provided to
them in Rabbinical Court Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law. Marriage and
Divorce Law, 1953- [1953] 7 LSI 139 (Isr.); see infra note 32 and accompanying text.
28
See infra note 47 and accompanying text (describing the way in which rabbinical
courts halt divorce cases of women who pursue tort claims against their husbands).
29
See infra, pp. 684-97 (segregation and Get oppression).
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Ministry of Transport, the court refrained from banning the usage of sexsegregated buses in Israel.30 Rather than order the abolition of this practice
altogether, as constitutional law mandates,31 the court advised women who
find this discriminatory practice offensive to use their tortious right to sue.32
While such “court counseling” is well intentioned, and to some extent
encouraging, it fails to protect women’s right to equality. Furthermore, it is
legally offensive because instead of the law protecting women, it excludes
women and suspends women's constitutional rights. 33 Instead, the courts
required women to exhaust all private means for receiving ex-post
compensation for discriminatory acts inflicted upon them.34 In Bizchutan v.
Yom L'Yom, it was a religious women’s legal right to be elected to
Parliament that the court failed to protect. 35 In that case, the court refused to
order a religious newspaper to publish the political advertisements of a
newly established women-inclusive religious party. The newspaper had
refused to publish the advertisement due to alleged “religious constraints”
prohibiting women from participating in political life.36
This article proceeds in three parts: Part II introduces the two
intersections of tort law in which Israel’s highest courts have evidently
affected the suspension of hu(wo)man rights. Part III uses Giorgio
Agamben’s philosophical work, drawing mainly on two of his eminent
30

HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transport, PD 64, 530, 566, 568 (2008) (Isr.).
This statement is relevant despite raging criticism of constitutional law's failure to
satisfactorily protect women's rights. See Jill Hasday, Women's Exclusion from the
Constitutional Canon, 2013 U. OF ILL. L. REV. 1715, 1716–22 (2013) (for the U.S.
legacy); see also Raday, supra note 9 (for Israeli legacy).
32
HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transport, PD 64, 530, 562-63 (2008) (Isr.).
33
See infra Part III (suspension identified using feminist analysis of Giorgio Agamben's
philosophy).
34
HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transport PD 64, 530, 562-63 (2008) (Isr.).
35
See generally TBC 17/20 Bizchutan v. Yom L'Yom (2015) (Isr.); see generally TA
25435-03-15 Bizchutan v. Yom L’Yom (2015) (Isr.); see generally HCJ 1868/15 Yom
L'Yom v. Bizchutan (2015) (Isr.) (The Israeli Supreme Court's reversal of the district
court's decision).
36
TBC 17/20 Bizchutan v. Yom L'Yom, *1, *2-3 (2015) (Isr.); TA 25435-03-15
Bizchutan v. Yom L’Yom, *1, *3 (2015) (Isr.).
31
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notions of “state of exclusion” and “suspension,” to illustrate three
evolutional stages of feminist-legal development: exclusion, lawlessness,
and suspension. By engaging with Agamben’s work, I criticize the stage of
suspension, and focus on establishing the much-needed distinction between
illegal suspension and legitimate referral of plaintiffs by courts to utilize
legal tools other than the ones brought before them. Finally, Part IV
reinforces the account of tort law as a tool for enhancing hu(wo)man rights
by engaging with theories of tort law that advocate using it to complement,
rather than to exclude, other legal tools already serving to shield hu(wo)man
rights.

II. RELIGIOUS EXCLUSION, SECULAR SUSPENSION
A. Torts and/vs. Family Law
Judaism exposes women to the risk of having a “recalcitrant husband”—
a husband who refuses to grant a get to his wife. This seemingly “religious”
problem is particularly acute and distinctively “legal” in Israel since the
state has incorporated Jewish tradition into its secular law. 37 In order to
better understand the pragmatic (political) motivations of both the
rabbinical courts and the Supreme Court in the case of referrals 38 as a
method of suppression, a brief overview of the consolidated Jewish and
secular civil law system employed in Israel is required. This context
concerns religiously grounded discriminatory practices that inflict harms
upon women, by allowing husbands to hold their wives captive and by
allowing their forced segregation in public spaces.

37

Marriage and Divorce Law, 1953-1953, 7 LSI 139 (Isr.) (The Israeli secular legal
system has embraced Jewish law for regulating the marriage and divorce of Israeli Jews,
granting sole jurisdiction over these matters to the state rabbinical courts who apply
religious Jewish rulings).
38
The term "referral" is used here to describe an adjudicative method whereby a court
receives a case and decides to refer it to another court due to lack of jurisdiction.
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In the Israeli system, rabbinical courts hold exclusive jurisdiction on
divorce issues. 39 However, civil family courts hold exclusive jurisdiction
over tort claims between family members. 40 State law has embraced the
unequal structure of the Jewish divorce where the completion of the divorce
proceedings is uniquely conditional upon the husband’s agreement to a
get.41 Husbands often use this unequal gender disposition to exploit their
power by extorting financial and custodial concessions from their wives or
by simply preventing their wives from remarrying.42 A tortious perspective
on this circumstance offers a theoretical platform for compelling the
husband to pay for not granting the get.43 The husband’s refusal to grant a
get, and specifically the unreasonable manner of his refusal, violates a duty
of care towards his wife under the negligence doctrine. Negligence law
indeed may impose liability on a husband who negligently abuses his
relative superiority over his wife.44 Moreover, the husband’s refusal to grant
a get with the full knowledge that doing so impinges upon a woman’s right
to marriage autonomy goes beyond recklessness and may be construed as
the intentional infliction of harm, an element of moral guilt. 45 The
imposition of liability on the husband, therefore, does not amount to
unwanted interference with his right to freedom of religion, which will
39

Court for Family Affairs Law, 5755-1995, SH No. 1537 p.393 (Isr.) (The definition of
"divorce issues,” however, was strictly interpreted by the Israel Supreme Court as
granting exclusivity to rabbinical courts only in matters concerning the validity and
procedure of the divorce).
40
Id.; see also, HCJ 6103/93 Levi v. Grand Rabbinical Court, 48(4) PD 591 (1994)
(Isr.).
41
Ayelet Blecher-Prigat & Benjamin Shmueli, The Interplay Between Tort Law and
Religious Family Law: The Israel Case, 26 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 279, 281 (2009).
42
See id. at 282.
43
See id. at 284.
44
Yifat Bitton, Protecting Equality through Torts and Imposing Negligence Liability
within Power Relations, 37 MISHPATIM 145, 179-82 (2008).
45
See generally Daniel Givelberg, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits
of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 45–49 (1982) (explicates the focus of intentional infliction of
emotional distress tort on "outrageousness").
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stand uninterrupted as long as he exercises it reasonably. Particularly, the
husband’s rights are not infringed since paying for the harmfulness
embedded in a person’s privilege does not amount to prohibiting its
execution by the payer.46 Such an intent, driven by the desire to either gain
advantageous alimony arrangements or simply inflict suffering as a form of
cruelty, justifies a claim for damages by the woman.47
Tort suits against recalcitrant husbands carry the risk of being seen as a
threat to the legitimacy of the eventual get from a religious standpoint. In a
nutshell, this perception of threat refers to the assertion that imposing
tortious liability on a husband might pressure him towards granting the
divorce under duress, which might invalidate the divorce as lacking the
religious mandatory consent component. 48 Coercing the husband to grant
the divorce is only allowable under special circumstances in Jewish law,
and a tort suit is not among them.49 Granting a coercive divorce poses a
significant religious difficulty, which bears legal implications. This
difficulty is primarily because a divorce granted under duress endangers the
status of the wife’s future offspring. In a case where a divorce is considered
or suspected to be given under duress, the wife is still deemed to be married
to her recalcitrant husband, meaning that any children that she would have
with another man would be considered mamzers, who may only marry
another Mamzer or a convert to Judaism.50 Moreover, this derogatory status
is hereditary, and the children of mamzers retain the mamzers status for
seven generations.51 Mortified by the potential realization of this scenario,
46

See Blecher-Prigat & Shmueli, supra note 41, at 297.
See Steven F. Friedell, The First Amendment and Jewish Divorce: A Comment on
Stern v. Stern, 18 J. OF FAM. L. 525, 532 (1980); see also Barbara J. Redman, Jewish
Divorce: What Can be Done in Secular Courts to Aid The Jewish Woman?, 19 GA L.
REV. 389, 417 (1985).
48
Irving Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah: A Study in Halacha, Contract, and the
First Amendment, 51 MD. L. REV. 312, 331 (1992).
49
See Blecher-Prigat & Shmueli, supra note 41, at 289.
50
Id.
51
Id.
47
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some feminists have suggested that Rabbis could be reasonably expected to
endorse deviation from the conservative and stringent interpretation of
Jewish divorce rules of granting a get.52
The feminist hope is to witness an adherence to particular sources within
Jewish law—traditionally neglected and overlooked—that could support
such a deviation and release Jewish women from the unfair burden of the
rabbinical divorce system. 53 Nevertheless, rabbinical courts’ increasingly
retaliatory tendencies towards tort claims for bettering women’s position in
relation to their recalcitrant husbands have shattered the feminist hope
embedded in them. 54 A series of cases were recently brought before the
rabbinical court where the women litigants were also engaged or intending
to engage in tort claims against their recalcitrant husbands in the civil
family court. The rabbinical judges ordered a suspension of the rabbinical
case before them until the women declared that they would surrender the
civil suit. 55 The rabbinical court excused its decisions as bound by the
concern that such a claim would endanger the divorce’s legitimacy due to
the coercive nature of tortious compensation. 56 The rabbinical courts
ordered the suspension of the women’s right to a religious ruling concerning
their personal status until they either withdrew their tort claim or otherwise
committed themselves to not pursuing such claims in the future. 57 Using
their power over women litigants, the rabbinical courts forced women to
52
I myself had hoped for such a positive development. See Yifat Bitton, Feminine
Matters, Feminist Analysis and the Dangerous Gap between Them, 28 TEL AVIV L. REV.
871, 896–97 (2005).
53
See id. at 885–86.
54
Yehiel S. Kaplan, Tort Liability of Recalcitrant Husbands in Light of Jewish Law:
from Controversy between Rabbinical and Secular Courts to Peaceful Compromise, 6
FAM. UNDER L. REV. 263, 268 (2013–2014).
55
Such cases are becoming more and more prevalent in the last five years, as the
numerous examples in Kaplan's article indicate. See Kaplan, supra note 54, at 284–93.
56
Blecher-Prigat & Shmueli, supra note 41, at 297.
57
By carefully reviewing rabbinical courts’ rhetoric, it is possible to identify the
abridgement of their jurisdiction by civil family courts as the real basis for their decisions
in these matters.
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“choose” between the two (non-)options of giving up the right to get a
divorce and pursuing the right to compensation in civil family court system.
Women have no adequate legal protection and are deserted in the legal
limbo of “lawlessness.”58
This practice of rabbinical courts to force women into choosing between
receiving a get, or pursuing the right for compensation can be illustrated in
the Cohen v. Cohen decision granted by the Grand Rabbinical Court.59 In
that case, the court ordered that the plaintiff—who had already suspended
her tort claim in the civil family court in accordance with a lower rabbinical
court’s order—had to make sure that the case be dismissed entirely by the
family court.60 Specifically, the court ordered the plaintiff to reactivate her
suspended tort suit in order to have the civil court decide it on its merits and
dismiss it explicitly and irreversibly.61 The rabbinical court also announced,
upon the plaintiff’s refusal to comply with this unprecedented order, that the
recalcitrant husband who had refused to grant his wife a get for 10 years,
even after the rabbinical court itself incarcerated him, would be released
from jail at once. 62 At the request of the plaintiff's lawyer and feminist
petitioners—present author included—acting in the capacity of amici
curiae, the rabbinical court agreed to suspend the husband’s release for a
few more days in order to allow the wife plaintiff to file an injunction with
the Supreme Court in its capacity as the High Court of Justice. 63
Unfortunately, the rare opportunity given to the Supreme Court to hold this
decision illegal was missed.64 Once the woman plaintiff filed her appeal, the
Grand Rabbinical Court issued an affidavit to the Supreme Court stating
58
The notion of “lawlessness” was developed within feminist theory. See Marjorie
Maguire Schultz, The Voices of Women: A Symposium on Women in Legal Education:
The Gendered Curriculum: Of Contracts and Careers, 77 IOWA L. REV. 55, 58 (1991).
59
SRC 87002/01 Rabbinical Court (PT), Cohen v. Cohen, *1, *1 (Isr.).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
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that it withdrew its recent decision and that the recalcitrant husband’s
release was no longer dependent upon the woman’s claim for tort remedy.65
Upon the Grand Rabbinical court's assurance that the plaintiff’s get case
would reactivate regardless of the status of her tortious claim, the Supreme
Court eventually ordered the injunction’s dismissal.66
In its decision, the Grand Rabbinical court subjected the plaintiff, and
thus all other Jewish women in Israel seeking divorce and filing for
compensation for their years of distress, to a multilayered suspension of
their legal rights, taking place in several ways. First, the decision resulted in
the suspension of women's rights to freedom of marriage based on their
constitutional right to autonomy.67 The unequal legal setting endowing the
husbands with the ultimate power to free women from their marriage takes
the right away from women. When the state adopted Jewish divorce
doctrines, which are primarily contingent upon a husband’s free will,
husbands indirectly received the authority to suspend women’s right to
autonomy. As such, husbands can hold women hostage. Second, the Grand
Rabbinical court's decision resulted in the suspension of women’s right to
exhaust their tortious claims vis-à-vis their husbands and receive
compensation for their suffering. 68 Third is the suspension of women’s
divorce suits—if those women refuse to withdraw their tort suits—by the
rabbinical court, which will not take any steps towards advancing the get’s
issuance.69

65

Id.
See HCJ 568/12 Mavoi Satum v. John Doe, *1, *3 (2013). This was ordered despite
the petitioner's claim that her case could still revert at the rabbinical court’s order to what
it was and despite the feminist amicus' claim that this case exemplifies the crisis women
undergo in rabbinical courts in trying to realize their tortious rights. Id.
67
See HCJ 7052/03 Adallah v. Minister of Interior 61 PD 202 (2006) (Isr.),
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG%5C03%5C520%5C070%5Ca47/03070520.a47.htm
(for the constitutional right to autonomy in Israeli law).
68
See Kaplan, supra note 54.
69
Blecher-Prigat & Shmueli, supra note 41, at 290.
66
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B. Torts and/vs. Constitutional Law
The second legal context that has forced women to suspend their tortious
right is the religious practice of sex segregation in the public sphere. Unlike
the clearly negative repercussions arising from the divorce setting, the
constitutional context may, at first glance, seem to do the opposite. More to
the point, when it comes to sex-segregated religious practices, where a
separation of men and women occurs based on religious justifications in
public areas or on public transportation, women are in a stronger legal
position. Specifically, Jewish law has a narrow foothold when it comes to
its use as justification for an allegedly legally protected rule of tolerance
towards religiously grounded sex-segregation. Sex-segregation practices are
markedly different from the consolidation of Jewish and secular law
dominating the case of marriage and divorce. 70 Indeed, when faced with
arguments concerning the freedom of religion and religious practices as
justification for the imposition of religious prohibitions in the public sphere,
Israeli courts tread very carefully. 71 The courts in Israel typically prefer
focusing on interpretations

and

distinctions grounded

in secular

justifications and emphasize cultural autonomy when allowing such
impositions to persist.72 Therefore, Israeli women seeking protection from
70

REPORT OF THE MINISTERIAL TEAM OF INQUIRY ON THE PHENOMENON OF THE
SEGREGATION OF WOMEN IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 60–67 (2013),
http://index.justice.gov.il/Pubilcations/Articles/Documents/DochHadaratNasim.pdf.
71
HCJ 98/54 Lazarovitz v. Food Controller, 1956 PD 10, 40, 55–56 (1954) (Isr.); HCJ
122/54 Axel v. The Mayor, Councilors and Residents of Netanyah, 1954 PD 8, 1524,
1535-37 (1954) (Isr.) (In both cases the Israel Supreme Court has restricted the executive
branch from employing religious justifications as primary considerations in an
administrative context).
72
HCJ 531/77 Baruch v. Tel Aviv Dist. Traffic Controller 1977 PD 32(B) 160, 163
(1977) (In Baruch, the Supreme Court, following riots by ultra-orthodox Jews demanding
the closure of certain roads to vehicular traffic on the Sabbath, allowed this closure
arguing it was meant to prevent harm to the sentiments of religious communities); HCJ
166/71 Halon v. The Mayor of the Local Council of Ussafiyah 1971 PD 25(B) (1971) (In
Halon, a café was restricted from playing "western" music or serving alcohol by the local
council of the Druze village of Isfiya. Despite these restrictions with clearly religious
origins, the Supreme Court insisted on treating the issue as cultural rather than religious,
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forced sex-segregation are allegedly more naturally and easily entitled to
legal relief.
C. Religiously Grounded Sex-Segregation in Israel – An Overview
Sex-segregation is not unknown to Israeli society, which employs the
practice extensively, and mainly in educational, army, health care, and
recreational settings. 73 Under the religious sex-segregation practice in
question, women were required to board the bus from the back door and sit
in the back of the bus, while men were to board from the front door and sit
in the front seats. 74 Sex-segregation is basic and primordial; 75 it is as
conclusive and brutal as it is “natural” and unquestionable, as long as men
are generally and visibly “different” from women. 76 Its “naturalness”
notwithstanding, sex-segregation is generally perceived as unconstitutional
based on its breach of a person’s right to equality.77 In Israel, the notion of
sex-segregation has been employed by feminist legal scholars and lawyers
in two conceptual paths. One claims that sex-segregation constitutes a
breach of women’s right to equality, which under Israeli constitutional law
derives from the women’s constitutional right to dignity.78 While the other
justifying the restrictions as acts intended to preserve the characteristics of the village,
and protect its residents' culture).
73
Michal L. Allon, Gender Segregation, Effacement, and Suppression: Trends in the
Status of Women in Israel, 22 DIG. MIDDLE E. STUD. 276, 284 (2013); Yael Tamir,
Siding with the Underdogs, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 48 (Joshua
Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
74
HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transp., PD 64, 530, 540 (2008) (Isr.).
75
The term “sex,” and not “gender,” segregation is used here to denote the bluntness of
referring to a person’s biological sexual characteristics as the object of this tactic.
76
David S. Cohen, Keeping Men "Men" and Women Down: Sex Segregation, Antiessentialism, and Masculinity, 33 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 509, 517 (2010).
77
Id. at 553.
78
HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Def., PD 43, 49 (1995) (Isr.),
http://www.dindayan.com/rulings/94045410.z01.pdf. The right to equality, since the
enactment of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, has become elevated to be a
principle of constitutional status as the right to equality is interpreted to be derived from
the Right to Dignity. See id. at 43; see also Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty
(5752-1992) (Isr.). Both accounts render religiously grounded segregation as an offense
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claims that sex-segregation breaches the women’s right to autonomy.79 Be
that as it may, both rights are protected under Israeli constitutional law and
warrant the intervention of the court. Besides being unconstitutional, sexsegregation contributes substantially to strengthening the dominance of men
over women, as well as the dominance of masculinity over femininity. 80
These dominances, in return, reinforce hegemonic masculinity as the
preferred masculinity, and derogate non-hegemonic masculinity, which is in
itself more egalitarian to women and more respectful of their humanistic,
rather than sexist, being.81
Regardless of their prevalence in liberal states, such as Israel, which
declaratively espouse sex equality, 82 when stemming from religiously
grounded rules, sex-segregation has a much farther goal in mind than its
“secular” counterpart, which “merely” aims to separate the sexes. 83
Religious sex-segregation is meant to result in the disappearance of the
female body from the public space altogether,84 and is therefore far more
dangerous to women’s equality and illegal by nature. 85 To illustrate this

that some consider tantamount to sexual harassment. See HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister
of Def., supra.; see also Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, supra.
79
HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transp., PD 64, 530, 579 (2008) (Isr.) (Joubran, J.,
concurring); Rimalt, supra note 1, at 104.
80
See Cohen, supra note 76, at 522–24.
81
See generally Zvi Trigger, Segregation between Men and Women as Sexual
Harassment, 35 IYUNEY MISHPAT 703, 740 (2013) (shows the correlation between a
woman's autonomy and her human, as opposed to sexual, being).
82
See infra p. 715 and accompanying notes 231–32.
83
See Cohen, supra note 76, at 516. These types of secular segregation include athletics,
restrooms, etc. Though less harmful to women's human rights than religion-based
segregation, many of the secular segregations warrant revision and reconsideration, given
our gender-changing world.
84
Allon, supra note 73, at 282.
85
See generally HCJ 9460/08 Hitorerut Yerushalmim v. Eged, *1 (2008) (In this case,
the petition was brought against Eged, a public transport company, who decided not to
allow bus billboards to showcase posters presenting female candidates to Jerusalem
municipality. Upon petition, Eged was quick to retract its decision. The HCJ therefore
dismissed the injunction, yet stated clearly that the petition was "based on a solid claim"
of unconstitutionality.); see generally ROSALYN DIPROSE, THE BODIES OF WOMEN
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point, consider the fact that while the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) keeps its
elite combat units open almost exclusively to men, the IDF still employs
female soldiers massively in all combat support apparatuses and shared
public spaces.86 With the increased enlistment of ultra-orthodox men, the
IDF is now creating declaredly male-only units, operating under the premise
that ultra-orthodox men cannot serve in the presence of women, or, as
described by Sasson-Levy, “the IDF is willing to create ‘sterile’
environments for them.”87 Thus, female soldiers in ultraorthodox units are
banned from even being in the general vicinity of male soldiers, and male
soldiers now assume female soldiers’ traditional roles at the units’
peripheries.88
While this typology of sex-segregation bears malicious and dangerous
implications, religiously grounded sex-segregation seems to enjoy the
leveraging protection of the liberal right to freedom of religion and
multiculturalism.89 Thus, religious sex-segregation should be interpreted in
light of the broader patriarchal sex-segregation context. This context
implies that the “difference” between the sexes, whether real or imagined,
has long served as a divisive element in several respects, with the most
prominent being the division between the private and the public, the
political and the non-political, and the physical separation in such spaces
such as amenities, schools, etc. 90 Therefore, religiously grounded sexsegregation should not be examined solely from a religious authenticity and
ETHICS, EMBODIMENT, AND SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 53 (1994) (for the theoretical and
philosophical analysis of the exclusion of the female body from public life phenomenon).
86
Orna Sasson-Levy & Sarit Amram-Katz, Gender Integration in Israeli Officer
Training: Degenerating and Regendering the Military, 33 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULT. &
SOC’Y 105, 114 (2007).
87
Orna Sasson-Levy, Gender Segregation or Women's Exclusion? The Military as a
Case Study, in CIV.-MIL. RELATIONS IN ISRAEL: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF STUART A.
COHEN 161 (2014).
88
Id.
89
Yaacov Ben-Shemesh, Law and Internal Cultural Conflicts, L. ETHICS HUM. RTS.
271, 274 (2007).
90
Trigger, supra note 81, at 713-14.
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multiculturalist perspective, but rather should be seen as a practice that
complies with patriarchy as a whole—one that also places men and women
in separate hierarchical spaces where men are superior. 91 As Martha
Nussbaum puts it, “when religion and politics intertwine, it is not only
religion that affects politics to the detriment of women,” but also vice
versa. 92 Reflecting her insight in the Israeli example is the fact that the
religiously grounded practice of sex-segregation—which has long-standing
opposition within the realm of religious interpretation of the Jewish
tradition93—has gradually become one of primary importance and genuine
virtue at the hands of the governmental institutions that have allowed it to
flourish.94
Despite its clear democratic foundations, Israel has witnessed growing
practices of religiously grounded coercive-sex-segregations in its public
spaces. The state has denounced some of these practices, while ignoring
others. 95 The increasingly worrying numbers of encounters such as sexsegregation practices in the private sphere in funeral homes, in lines to
receive care in HMO’s, and in the public state sponsored sphere in public
transportation and public memorial services,96 led Israeli government to act
upon the issue. Israel’s Attorney General assembled a “Ministry of Justice
Committee of Inquiry on the Phenomenon of the Segregation of Women in
91

Stopler, supra note 2, at 160.
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH 262 (2000).
93
Avinoam Rosenak, "Dignity of The Congregation" as a Defense Mechanism: A
Halakchic Ruling by Rabbi Joseph Messas, 13 NASHIM: J. JEWISH WOMENS STUD. &
GENDER ISSUES 183 (2007) (In this study of Jewish law, Rosenak casts doubt on the idea
of the segregation between the sexes in a much more private sphere, within the Jewish
synagogue itself).
94
Trigger, supra note 81, at 716 (Though known in ancient Jewish history, sexsegregation has never been as extremely and as aggressively present or enforced as it has
been in the last decade of Jewish/Israeli life).
95
REPORT OF THE MINISTERIAL TEAM OF INQUIRY ON THE PHENOMENON OF THE
SEGREGATION OF WOMEN IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 9 (2013),
http://index.justice.gov.il/Pubilcations/Articles/Documents/DochHadaratNasim.pdf.
96
Id. at 5.
92
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the Public Sphere” in order to review the phenomenon, outline the causes
for the segregation in each particular case, and suggest recommendations.97
The committee’s harsh report unequivocally considered sex-segregation
practices illegal.98 Ironically, the government not only avoided the adoption
of the report’s recommendations but also launched a Ministry of Education
program for subsidizing gender exclusive ultra-orthodox campuses in public
universities and colleges throughout the country.99
This evolving trend of state-supported religious sex-segregation
ultimately reached the Supreme Court of Israel with women petitioning that
their right to equality was being brutally infringed by these segregational
practices, and imploring the Court to restore the protection of their right to
equality.
1. The Case for Sex-Segr egation in Isr aeli Buses – Backgr ound
Israel’s public transportation companies provided their services to the
local ultra-orthodox community up until the late 1990s, as an integral part
of their routine service. Then, a Ministry of Transportation committee
decided to provide services tailored to the specific needs of this
community. 100 The ultra-orthodox male hegemony negotiating the issue
with the state required, among other demands, a total separation between
men and women in bus services. 101 The obvious financial interest of the
public transportation companies in expanding their activities to this large
97

Id. at 6.
Id. at 60-67.
99
See generally HCJ 6667/14 Dr. Yofi Tirosh v. The Council For Higher Educ., *1
(2015) (In Tirosh, the Supreme Court acknowledged the potential damage to women's
right of equality by providing public funding (through the Council of Higher Education)
to male only Ultra-Orthodox campuses. However, the court was satisfied with the council
taking it upon itself to publish guidelines addressing the issue of equality in the funding
budget associated with these campuses. Effectively, this Supreme Court decision meant
that the substantive claim of discrimination concerning women's right to equality would
not be addressed in the current budget.).
100
Trigger, supra note 81, at 706.
101
Rimalt, supra note 1, at 118.
98
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segment of the population matched the ministry’s interests in encouraging
public transport and generally earning political credit in the ultra-orthodox
community. 102 This position in support of segregation also gained some
traction among legal scholars who argued the necessity of viewing through
the intercommunal perspective of the ultra-orthodox community itself. 103
These scholars suggested that no actual contradiction necessarily exists
between the ultraorthodox women’s right to equality, and the ultra-orthodox
community's right to freedom of religion.104 After lengthy deliberations and
alleged commitments to serving all passengers equally, the Minister of
Transportation issued a permit allowing the bussing companies to operate
sex-segregated bus lines.105
Soon after the permit’s issuance, violent acts were perpetrated against
women who did not comply; the rides were usually “supervised” by a man
who ensured that women moved to the back.106 Women who did not comply
faced verbal and even physical assaults;107 in most cases, the bus drivers
were indifferent to the women being terrorized on their bus,108 and in some
cases actively participated in the oppressive acts by ordering the protesting
women off the bus. 109 As a result of these abusive incidents, a group of
social-change organizations and women—some of whom self identified as
ultra-orthodox—petitioned the Israeli Supreme Court in 2007, asking the
court to order the abolition of the practice of segregated bus lines.110 The
102

Id.
Alon Harel, Benign Segregation? A Case Study of the Practice of Gender Separation
in Buses in the Ultra-Orthodox Community in Israel, 20 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 64, 66
(2004); A. Yehuda Warburg, The Practice of Gender Separation on Buses in the UltraOrthodox Community in Israel: A View from the Liberal Cathedral, 44 TRADITION: A J.
ORTHODOX JEWISH THOUGHT 19, 22-24 (2011).
104
Id.
105
Rimalt, supra note 1, at 118.
106
Id. at 117.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transp., PD 64, 530, 540-41 (2008) (Isr.).
103
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petitioners claimed that this “separate but equal” reasoning was
unconstitutional, 111 and therefore required the court’s intervention in the
form of an invalidation of the license permit issued by the state to these
publicly funded route operators. 112 When the case reached the Supreme
Court, a public committee appointed to review the legality of the segregated
routes declared the operation illegal and recommended the abolition of its
practice of formally segregated doors and seats. 113 Interestingly, the
Minister of Transportation refused to adopt the special committee’s
recommendation and notified the court of his reluctance to abolish the
permit in question as long as the route “recommended” and did not “coerce”
passengers to act in accordance with the segregated boarding and seating
policy. 114 The petitioners, on the other hand, called for the complete
invalidation of both the practice and the government permit. 115 The
Supreme Court decided not to abolish the segregated bus lines or invalidate
the route operators’ permits, but it did emphasize the prohibition of any
coercive practices.116 The court ruled that as long as passengers voluntarily
boarded the bus from different doors and willingly sat in different parts of
the bus, there was nothing legally prohibited in the route operators’
activation of the bus lines.117

111

Id. at 540. As Justice Danziger explains in Regan, by referring to both Brown v. Board
of Education as well as to the Israeli Miller case, the sex-segregation of men and women
in and of itself makes it a violation of the right to equality, positioning the women forced
to sit at the back of the bus in a state of inferiority. Id. at 577–80.
112
HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transp., PD 64, 530, 540 (2008) (Isr.). It took
almost four years until the petition was finally decided (The petition was submitted on
Jan. 24 2007, and the ruling was given on Jan. 5, 2011). One of the reasons for this delay
was an attempt by the government to have the case settled out of court. Id. at 541–47.
113
Id. at 546-47.
114
Id. at 550.
115
Id. at 549.
116
Id. at 567-68.
117
See id. at 555-70. Given the scope of the present study, I have not fully detailed the
court's full (and more sophisticated) decision.
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When coupled with patriarchy and its inherent disadvantage to women,
this invocation of individual consent can hardly be considered valid or
genuine. 118 The Supreme Court also failed to ban the “rear boarding”
practice, regardless of the petitioner’s claim that it has a humiliating effect
for women.119
While the Supreme Court applied unequivocal rhetoric in condemning
the sex-segregation practice, describing it as denigrating to women and
shameful to Israeli democracy, in reality, the court did nothing more than
warn the bus companies against any coercion women might be subjected to
as a result of religious extremists’ behavior on the bus.120 Seeking to bolster
its dedication to equality, the court briefly counseled women to make use of
tort claims to sue, in particular cases, perpetrators whose abusive behavior
coerced women to sit in “women only” seats.121
Taken alone, this court dictum can be viewed as encouraging for women
by virtue of the court’s fostering of the tools required to submit
antidiscriminatory tort claims. However, the dictum can also be read as
calling for the use of tort claims to alleviate, ex post facto, the ex ante
suspension of women’s constitutional rights. To that end, the court used tort
law to suspend, whether temporarily or perpetually, women’s constitutional
right to protection against the discrimination inherent in sex-segregation
practices.122 More importantly, and as opposed to the case of the rabbinical
118

Frances Raday, Culture Religion and Gender, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 663, 702 (2003).
Trigger, supra note 81, at 734. Trigger asserts that "sneaking" onto the bus from
behind is humiliating in its symbolic linguistic significance. The court treated this
practice as having a "technical" nature, mainly designed to facilitate the segregation. See
HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transport, PD 64, 530, 557 (2008) (Isr.).
120
Id. at 567–69 (Danizger, J., concurring).
121
The court referred, inter alia, to one of my own articles, which developed the
theoretical framework for facilitating such antidiscriminatory tort claims. Id. at 563; see
Yifat Bitton, Bringing Power Relations within the Scope of Negligence Liability, 38
MISHPATIM 145, 199–214 (2008).
122
Sex-segregation is generally unconstitutional based on its breach of a person's right to
equality. HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Def., PD 43, 49 (1995) (Isr.). In addition to
being contrary to the constitutional right to equality in Israel, in the U.S., this practice
119
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courts’ suspension of women’s right for either divorce or a tort claim,123
where it might be possible to allege a religious motivation, this kind of
suspension is applied by the highest instance of the civil court system
against the system’s own democratic values. Furthermore, the suspension of
women’s rights under the family law regime has been notoriously wellestablished from the State of Israel’s founding,124 while the suspension of
rights in the constitutional domain was not introduced to the legal system
before this case was handed down.125
2. Elections and Religiously Gr ounded Segr egation
The Bizchutan case represents another Supreme Court ruling indicating a
trend of ignoring women’s rights.126 Here, a group of young, vigorous, and
brave ultra-orthodox women decided to rebel against their exclusion from
participation in their community’s representation in the Israeli parliament,
the Knesset.127 Strongly adhering to the notion of the public sphere as being
reserved to men alone, ultra-orthodox religious male authorities dictate the
systematic suppression of women from participating in any kind of partisan
political activity, especially in its purest incarnation, the parliament.128 The
women in Bizchutan, however, decided to challenge this ban and founded a
women-led party to run for Parliament in the 2015 national elections. 129
Striving to utilize their community’s public media, the women’s party
sought to purchase advertisements in their community’s most widely
also counters the right to equality protected under federal and state antidiscrimination
laws. See Cohen, supra note 76, at 553.
123
See supra, main text at p. 680-82 (introducing the rabbinical courts' method of
suspending the rights of women seeking divorce writ).
124
HALPERIN-KADDARI, supra note 5, at 227-29.
125
This is not to suggest that all the justified claims of women for equality were admitted,
but rather to stress the fact that a suspension methodology of that kind is new to this legal
regime.
126
See TBC 17/20 Bizchutan v. Yom L'Yom, *1 (2015) (Isr.).
127
Id. at 1–2.
128
Id. at 3; Rimalt, supra note 1, at 99.
129
TBC 17/20 Bizchutan v. Yom L'Yom, *1, *1 (2015) (Isr.).
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circulated newspaper to launch their election campaign.130 Unsurprisingly,
the newspaper’s management denied the women's request, leaving the
women with no other relevant media outlet within the relevant ultraorthodox community for voicing their campaign advertisements. 131 The
newspaper had thus brutally abridged the women’s right to freedom of
speech based on its discriminatory opposition to the women's demand for
free political expression.
Armed with evidence of this abridgement, the women sought protection
from the election committee for the blatant discrimination by the
newspapers and expected a writ ordering the newspapers to allocate some of
their advertisement space for the women’s use.132 The committee, headed
by a Supreme Court justice, dismissed the case even though the justice
implied the newspapers’ refusal was conceivably illegal; the justice stated,
“This petition is not lacking in merit; rather, it seems to have strong
footing.”133 He further referred to the women’s right to equality during an
election as a “superior principle,” 134 allegedly “comporting with the
petitioners’ claims.”135 Yet, rather than abolish the human rights violation
presented before him, the justice decided to deny the petition.136 In doing
so, he counseled the petitioners to instead seek redress through one of
Israel’s tort ordinances, explaining it was the correct forum to advocate the
women’s grievances. 137 Unfortunately, this decision was given only one
130

Id.
The Lithuanian Ultra-Orthodox community is highly isolated in Israel, and it is the
main constituency that the women in Bizchutan come from, and were aiming for, in their
campaign. This community has very few sanctioned media sources that community
members are allowed to read, the newspaper in question being one of them. Id. at *3.
132
Id. at *2.
133
Id. at *4.
134
TBC 17/20 Bizchutan v. Yom L'Yom, *1, *4–5 (2015) (Isr.).
135
Id.
136
Id. at *5.
137
Id. at *4. The justice justified the decision by stating the petitioners had a more
appropriate remedy of exercising their right under civil law to seek redress through
another statute—the Law against Discrimination in Products and Services and in
131
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month before the election itself, allowing no reasonable timetable for
exhausting any tortious right that the party may or may not have
possessed.138 Undeterred by the election committee's denial of their petition,
the women appealed to the district court, which granted them an executive
order,139 only to have the Supreme Court annul the order two days later on
the ground that there was not enough time left to conduct a thorough
consideration of the issues involved in the case due to the fact that the
actual election was due in four days.140
Under these circumstances, the petitioners not only saw the denial of
protection against the bigotry of patriarchal subordination, but were also
prevented from using effective media exposure they desperately needed in
order to facilitate their constitutional right as women to be elected.141 At the
same time, this decision affected the ultra-orthodox community’s
constitutional right to enjoy informed elections.142
In this case, as well as in the case of the segregated bus lines, women’s
right to equality, generally well entrenched in the Israeli legal system and
recently granted constitutional status, has effectively been denied. How was
such regressive development made possible? What tools can be used to
conceptualize it? The next section addresses these puzzling queries.
Admission to Amusements Facilities and Public Places. 5761-2000, SH, No. 1765, 58
(Isr.).
138
HCJ 1868/15 Yom L'Yom v. Bizchutan, *1, *1 (2015) (Isr.).
139
TA 25435-03-15 Bizchutan v. Yom L’Yom, *1, *10 (2015) (Isr.).
140
HCJ 1868/15 YomL'Yom v. Bizchutan, *1, *5-7 (2015) (Isr.). Although Justice
Hendel used the formal excuse of "delayed pleading" to invalidate the mandatory
injunction, he actually used terms implying the lack of reasonable time for deciding the
case underlaid the ruling: "The picture arising from this description is that this delay has
given rise to a situation under which questions of grave importance have not been able to
receive adequate consideration . . . we are dealing here with complicated and highly
important questions, that warrant careful and structured deliberation, unlimited by
pressure or time constraints." Id. at *6.
141
HCJ 8238/96 Abu-Arar v. Minister of Interior 18 PD 36, 26, 38-39 (1998) (Isr.)
(discussing the constitutional importance of the right to elect and be elected).
142
HCJ 142/89 Le’Or Movement v. Speaker of the Knesset, PD 44(3) 529, 554 (1985)
(Isr.).
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III. WOMEN’S RIGHT TO EQUALITY UNDER “STATE OF EXCEPTION”
In Part III, I turn to Giorgio Agamben’s theoretical work. Drawing on
two of his constitutive notions of “state of exclusion” and “suspension,” I
illustrate three evolutional stages of feminist-legal development: exclusion,
lawlessness, and suspension. By engaging with Agamben’s work, I criticize
what I refer to as the third stage of women exclusion from the law’s
protection, where suspension tactics of hu(wo)man rights are used against
women, who are being put under “state of exception.” Later in this part, I
focus on establishing the much-needed distinction between illegal
suspension and legitimate referral of plaintiffs by courts to exhaust the
former's legal rights elsewhere in the legal system. To this end, I define the
scope of “suspension” based on a three-pronged test designed to identify its
illegality.
A. From Lawlessness to Suspension
The legal system has yet to abolish women’s outsider position. 143 The
modern western legal system’s disregard for women contaminates the
system’s missions and doctrines.144 This failure to identify women’s needs
and redress their hurts was identified as a state of Lawlessness, where the
lack of legal intervention accounted for lack of proper protection of women,
who needed it.145 The most prominent embodiment of Lawlessness was the
legal perception of the home. Bound by the underpinnings of liberal
thought, the legal system, feminists claimed, considered the home, which
was, and to a substantial extent still is, an effectively feminine domain, a
private haven, protected from the law’s invasion, leaving the women at the
mercy of Lawlessness. 146 The public-private dichotomy delineated the

143

CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN'S LIVES, MEN'S LAWS 17, 23–24 (2005).
Nadin Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women’s Subordination and the Role of Law,
in THE POLITICS OF LAW – A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 151 (David Kairys ed., 1990).
145
MACKINNON, supra note 146, at 17, 106–09.
146
Id.
144
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state’s legitimate regulatory function with regard to the public, while
ordering the state’s refrainment from interfering with private matters. This
dichotomy was used throughout the patriarchal tradition as a tool for
preserving the inferior status of women in society.

147

This liberal

proposition led legislatures and courts to promulgate statutes and doctrines
that were blind to women’s needs and suffering. 148 One such statute
identified “rape” as only occurring if the woman was not the rapist’s
lawfully married wife.149 The court’s refusal to apply rules of fairness or to
enforce intermarriage contractual relations embodied such desertion. 150
Similar phenomena is identifiable in Israeli law, albeit in a more subtle
form.151
The law has progressed in including women. The law still forms and
facilitates the inferiority of women to men, but liberal law continues to
foster more rights designed to elevate women’s status.152 Within this new
functionality, while the law is present in many aspects of women’s lives and
protects them against discrimination, the suspension of this protection is a
new means for preserving women’s vulnerable and inferior position as
illustrated in the cases introduced above.153
147

See JOAN B. LANDES, FEMINISM: THE PUBLIC & THE PRIVATE 3–20 (1998).
See Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1,
11–29 (1992) (introducing the many ways in which the private/public distinction has
been used to marginalize women).
149
SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 36-38 (1987).
150
Thus, the First Restatement of the Law of Contracts (1932), § 587 states, “[B]argain
between married persons or persons contemplating marriage to change the essential
incidents of marriage is illegal.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 587 (AM. LAW
INST. 1932); see generally Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67
N.C.L. REV. 1103, 1114–21 (1989) (suggests treating marriage as an investment
partnership for divorce financial settlements).
151
See generally READINGS IN LAW, GENDER AND FEMINISM (Daphne Barak-Erez et al.
eds., 2007) (providing an analysis of how Israeli written law and case law are used to
preserve the inferior status of women, and in particular under the private/public
dichotomy discussed above).
152
MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM 37 (1992).
153
See the cases introduced supra Part II (demonstrating women's rights suspension
within liberal and modern law).
148
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B. Suspension as Exception
In order to conceptualize the Israeli court decisions in this article as
having employed an illegal suspension of women’s rights, I wish to draw on
Giorgio Agamben’s political and legal theory of the State of Exception
(Exception). Although a thorough discussion that would do justice to the
depth of Agamben’s body of scholarly work would exceed the limits of this
article, shedding light on the prominent notion of Exception would be
sufficiently effective in suggesting that suspending women’s rights
constitutes an Exception under his theory and that this Exception is the new
Lawlessness.
Agamben critically conceptualizes the rise of power structures that
governments employ in times of the supposed crises labeled as
‘emergencies.’

154

Declared by the sovereign under his normal legal

authority, which is the “Legal Norm,” “emergency” is perceived to be the
epitome of the preservation of the law, enjoying socio-legal legitimacy.155
Temporal in nature, and therefore contrary to the persistence of a state of
“Legal Norms,” in reality, “emergency” often ends up becoming permanent
and unremitting.156 As Agamben described,
Indeed, the state of exception has today reached its maximum
worldwide deployment. The normative aspect of law can thus be
obliterated and contradicted with impunity by a governmental
violence that—while ignoring international law externally and

154

GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 26 (2005). An example of such emergency
is the declaration of "war on terrorism," as employed by the Bush administration pursuant
to the 9/11 terror events. See infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
155
This idea is encapsulated in the opening statement of Carl Schmitt's Political
Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty: “Sovereign is he who decides
on the exception. Only this definition can do justice to a borderline concept.” CARL
SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 5
(1985).
156
Agamben argues that today there is no clear distinction between the Norm and the
Exception, and the modern states tend to include the necessity and the exception within
the juridical order itself. See AGAMBEN, supra note 157, at 26.
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producing a permanent state of exception internally—nevertheless
still claims to be applying the law.157
Agamben further maintains that the state of Exception is in fact the
desertion of law to an emerging “zone of anomie, in which violence without
any juridical form acts.”158 And yet, the state of exception is not a state of
pure violence outside the sphere of the law. Instead, it introduces a kind of
sovereign violence that “neither makes nor preserves law, but suspends
it.”159 In other words, in the modern liberal state, Norm and Exception are
bound to one another, and the important task is not to delineate the two.
Rather, it is to understand the way in which the Exception organizes and
articulates itself through the very notion of the Law itself.160 Consider, for
instance, how this process played out in America’s legal reactions to the
9/11 terror attacks. After 9/11, the Bush administration declared an
ever-expanding state of Exception, in which more and more suspensions of
law occurred in the name of the war against terrorism.

161

These

constitutionally approved suspensions were gradually expanded with the
active acquiescence of both the American Congress and the courts, to the
point whereby ultimately and unavoidably, an exceptional rule of

157

Id. at 87.
Id. at 59; see Stephen Humphreys, Nomarchy: On the Rule of Law and Authority in
Giorgio Agamben and Aristotle, 19 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 331–51 (2006).
159
AGAMBEN, supra note 157, at 54. This distinction between violence and “pure
violence” comes from Agamben’s reading of the dialectical correspondence in Carl
Schmitt’s response to Walter Benjamin’s definition of violence as being antithetical to a
state of lawfulness. See WALTER BENJAMIN, Critique of Violence, in WALTER
BENJAMIN: SELECTED WRITINGS, VOL 1: 1913–1926, at 239 (5th ed. 2002).
160
According to Agamben, “the essential task of a theory of the state of exception is not
simply to clarify whether it has a juridical nature or not, but to define the meaning, place
and modes of its relation to the law.” AGAMBEN, supra note 157, at 51.
161
Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the
Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1023 (2004); Rens van Munster, The
War on Terrorism: When the Exception Becomes the Rule, 17 INT’L J. FOR SEMIOTICS OF
L. 141, 142 (2004).
158
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suspension became prevalent and normalized. 162 In Israel too, an official
state of emergency has prevailed since the state’s establishment in 1948,
and has lasted ever since.163 This state of emergency originally occurred at a
time of extreme-war reality, which was perpetrated against the new Israeli
state by adjacent Arab states.164 Ever since though, it is extended from time
to time, mostly in order to maintain the validity of the many administrative
orders used by the IDF establishments as part of the fight against terror and
illegal invasions by Palestinians. 165 The pervasiveness of the declaration,
hence, goes beyond these “political” affairs to substantially affecting clearly
“civilian” matters.166
Agamben’s nonbinary perception aligns with Paul Khan’s idea that the
Legal Norm and the Exception swirl and attempt to control each other.
Khan, a prominent legal-culture philosopher of constitutional law,
maintains that the Legal Norm will always seek to extend toward the
exceptional decisions and to normalize them. 167 At the same time, the
Exception will also attempt to penetrate the legal order during both ordinary
and exceptional moments.168
The cases discussed above illustrate how exceptions to the norm that is
the women’s legal right are introduced by the court, and in doing so the
court creates suspension to the human rights of women. Namely, the
women’s right to both constitutional and family law recourses, as well as
162
Jonathan Hafetz, Military Detention in the "War on Terrorism": Normalizing the
Exceptional After 9/11, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 31, 33 (2012).
163
Yoav Mehozay, The Fluid Jurisprudence of Israel's Emergency Powers: Legal
Patchwork as a Governing Norm, 46 L. SOC. REV. 137 (2012).
164
Id. at 143.
165
ZE'EV SEGAL, DEMOKRATIA ISRAELIT, 152, 158 (1990).
166
Yuval Shany & Ido Rosenzwieg, High Court of Justice Rejects Petition to End Israel's
State of Emergency [HCJ 3091/99], 41 TERROR & DEMOCRACY (2012),
http://en.idi.org.il/analysis/terrorism-and-democracy/issue-no-41/hcj-rejects-petition-toend-israels-state-of-emergency/.
167
PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 34 (2011).
168
See id. at 54.
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tort remedy, are reclassified by the court as mutually exclusive. Thus, this
creates an exception, and in so doing suspends the human rights of the
women. The realization of human rights requires that all possible remedies
secure these rights and be available to the women. In the cases analyzed in
this article, the suspension is far less overt in its declaration and far more
focused in its application. As shown earlier, this suspension applies only to
particular legal rights and is carried out within a framework that is formally
governed by the law; it applies to tort-based rights, in realms where the
legal system acts normally: constitutional petitions and family-related
cases.169 Such a suspension blurs the distinction between the Exception and
the Norms greatly by manifesting no acute or distinctive signs of the crisis
or emergency that typically give rise to a “state of exception” that suspends
the relevance of the rule of law. 170 In other words, it mandates the
identification of “Lawlessness” even in situations where the law prevails, as
long as the court orders the suspension of one set of legal rights in
deference to another: tort law versus family law (in the case of the
rabbinical court), and tort law versus constitutional law (in the cases of the
Supreme Court). This triviality and banality of exclusion is well echoed in
Agamben’s theory, where he states, “[I]n our age all citizens can be said, in
a specific but extremely real sense, to appear virtually as homines sacri.”171
Using this Latin phrase, Agamben pertains to yet another anchor concept he
developed, the Homo Sacer, a person whose life is bare and unprotected by
the law.172 In the very same way, this realization resonates in Kahn’s view

169

See HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transp., PD 64, 530, 534 (2008) (Isr.) (for
suspension in constitutional realm); see HCJ 568/12 Mavoi Satum v. John Doe, *1, *3
(2013) (for suspension in family-related realm).
170
See Stephen Humphreys, Legalizing Lawlessness: On Giorgio Agamben's State of
Exception, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 677 (2006) (for a more comprehensive account).
171
GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 111 (1998).
172
Id. at 8, 71.
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that exceptional moments are perceptible as less radical and catastrophic
and more ordinary and banal.173
In contrast to the common usage of Agamben’s notion in subsequent
critical theory as being primarily relevant in times of declared emergencies,
my account of the state of exception is gendered: the exception represents
an existential normality for women. This realization warrants introducing—
this time, from a feminist perspective—two more key concepts of
Agamben’s pivotal political structures of Rule and Exception, namely Bare
Life and Political Existence.
Agamben’s work, though insightful and humanistic in nature, has been
criticized by feminists for its gender blindness. 174 Feminist critics say
Agamben failed to identify the unique modes of exclusion within inclusion
that characterize women’s experience; meaning that though they are
“included” as citizens, women are nevertheless subjugated to unequal
treatment under the law, and therefore, still “excluded.” At its core,
Agamben’s work concentrates on the ways in which the distinction between
citizens and noncitizens is a primary mechanism allowing a separate, yet
legally justified, treatment of humans by the liberal state.175 According to
this distinction, the sovereign cherishes and protects the lives of citizens and
their inherent rights, thereby rendering the citizens’ existence political.
These citizens enjoy Political Existence. In contrast, the lives of the
noncitizen homo sacers and the rights they entail are constantly abridged by

173

KAHN, supra note 170, at 126. In this way, Kahn explains how exceptional moments
“outside” the legal norm can be perceived not only on massive scale such as in
revolutions or similar tremendous phenomena but also as Equity: a phenomenon of a
political decision making exception in the norm on a much smaller scale. Id.
174
E. P. Ziarek, Feminist Aesthetics: Transformative Practice, Neoliberalism, and the
Violence of Formalism, 25 DIFFERENCES 101, 115 (2014); P. Deutscher, The Inversion of
Exceptionality: Foucault, Agamben, and "Reproductive Rights", 107 S. ATLANTIC Q. 55,
70 (2008). Deutscher, nevertheless, considers this genderless theory as having the
potential to embrace the feminist standpoint. Id.
175
See Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385
(1989) (for the way the liberal state (dis)functions within an Exception).
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the sovereign, rendering these second-class human beings exposed to Bare
Life.176
The masculine inclination of Agamben’s terms is primarily a result of the
modern political order’s masculine foundation, a fact Agamben failed to
identify.177 Women’s social status does not align itself squarely with this
border-identifying analysis that Agamben identifies in practices of
differentiation and categorization of people as entertained by Western
states. 178 While the sovereign formally identifies women as citizens and
therefore normally set to enjoy its protections, this enjoyment only goes as
far as men’s rights allow them.179 Consider, for example, a woman’s right to
exercise her sexual liberty and enjoy her sexual autonomy, which was
confined to a man’s property-based right to control his wife’s sexuality as
part of his rightful possession of her within the family. 180 This legal
constellation

challenges

Agamben’s

paradigm

and

proves

that

acknowledgement as citizens can still expose an entire group of people to
desertion and exclusion from the protection of the law as if they were de
facto noncitizens.
The female experience of suppression under the law illustrates how the
modern territories of liberal state “camps” that Agamben envisions as
spaces of exclusion are not limited to identifiable camps designed to hold
176

See, e.g., Joan Copjec, IMAGINE THERE IS NO WOMAN 27 (2002) (Copjec claims that
Agamben failed to identify that masculine lives has become the foundation for the
modern political order).
177
DEUTSCHER, supra note 177, at 59.
178
See Michalinos Zembylas, Agamben’s Theory of Biopower, 26 J. CURRICULUM
THEORIZING 31, 38 (2010) (describes the typical person Agamben envisions as
universalist).
179
See generally Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel and Haiti, 26 CRITICAL INQUIRY 821
(separating politics from the economy as establishing the gendered supremacy of men
over women); see also JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, ONLY PARADOXES TO OFFER: FRENCH
FEMINISTS AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 2–3 (1996) (during the greatest democratization
process in French history, women were excluded from participating in promulgating the
process’s underlying premises).
180
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal
Education or “The Fem-Crits Go to Law School,” 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61, 73 (1988).
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(or sterilize) women in order to “draw the line” between them and men.181
Instead, women are put in symbolic, rather than physical or noticeable,
camps whenever the sovereign systematically neglects to protect the
women’s rights. 182 Women, therefore, encompass realms of Bare Life
alongside their Political Existence within their individual bodies. However,
Agamben’s analysis and observations are still relevant to women. His
fascination with the conceptual field of the “in-between” and the
“indistinction zone,” 183 where it is impossible to identify social exclusion
without identifying inclusion at the same time, resonates with women’s
rights. In this space, an inclusion into a political community only seems
possible through simultaneous exclusion of others who are unable to
become full legal subjects.184 The feminist voice does, however, call for a
more nuanced application of this notion; one that will take the peculiarities
characterizing the gendered experience of women and the hierarchies of the
Homo Sacer that gender reveals within Agamben’s theory into account.185
181

PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL 238 (2008). Moreover, the experience of a “bare
life” of women’s desertion by their own sovereign government and judiciary is rarely as
extreme and abhorrent as in the ruling of Justice O.W. Holmes Jr. in Buck v. Bell. See
generally Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (allowing compulsory sterilization of
mentally disabled woman).
182
AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, supra note 174, at 174. Agamben describes concentration
camps in Nazi Germany, as the embodiment of such territory, but widens it to current
liberal states where, for example, there are areas in airports that are designated for
refugees seeking shelter where the refugees are put outside the protection of law and
under the violent sovereignty of police forces. Id.
183
This characteristic of Agamben’s work is a common thread that goes beyond his
Homo Sacer project. See PHILIPPE MESNARD, The Political Philosophy of Giorgio
Agamben: A Critical Evaluation, 5 TOTALITARIAN MOVEMENTS & POL. RELIGIONS 139,
140 (2004).
184
AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, supra note 174, at 181. It is therefore assumed that this
borderline "zone of indistinction" is where law and its absence render only some
communities legal subjects.
185
Agamben’s work, in this respect, can be seen as too dichotomous, as it seeks to
identify the moment in which the Homo Sacer is constituted, rather than recognizing the
continuum upon which he/she operates. See Thomas Lemke, “A Zone of Indistinction” –
A Critique of Giorgio Agamben’s Concept of Biopolitics, 7 OUTLINES 8, 8-9 (2005).
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Returning to the case of Israel, two more notions are useful for
conceptualizing the suspension’s damaging effect to women. Agamben
identifies two elements as accompanying the process of “exclusion” by the
sovereign: desertion and sacredness.186 The desertion element relates to a
lack of effective legal protection where it should have applied, while the
sacredness element requires the excluded subject to make a sacrifice that
strips him or her of sacred rights.187 Further, Agamben criticizes the notion
of sacredness involved in the process, arguing it reduces living to its
minimal experience: that of simply being alive and not being endowed with
human rights.188 These elements manifest when Jewish women attempt to
exert their tortious rights. First, courts’ decisions in the get and bus
segregation embody the notion of desertion, but in a manner somewhat
different from the one portrayed by Agamben. Here, the desertion is not
total or formal. Moreover, it is the kind of desertion done with sympathy
and aimed at pursuing other legal remedies available to the women
petitioning the court.189 Second, the sacredness in these situations is applied
through the court’s implied supposition that the women petitioners enjoy
some rights while deprived of others, thus securing the sacredness of their
being. Identifying the Israeli cases as demonstrating Agamben’s critical
theory is possible by treating them as a more nuanced, gendered, and
individualized manner of exclusion.
In sum, sketching the feminist evolution from an Agambenian
perspective may be described as follows: at the early stages of modern
citizenship women fought to harmonize their formal recognition as citizens
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RASMUS UGILT, GIORGIO AGAMBEN: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 44-46 (2014).
AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, supra note 174, at 8; see also A. S. Purakayastha & S. S.
Das, Absolutist Democracy, Homo Sacer and the Resistance of Bare Life, 6 HISTORY &
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element in Agamben’s work).
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with their substantive basic citizenship rights. 190 Foremost among these
rights is the right to vote.191 Upon achieving these primary rights in most
liberal states, women turned their focus to “secondary” rights that made
their lives political rather than merely natural, as Agamben would put it.192
In other words, they moved on to the next battle proving women were
entitled to the law protecting their rights, even at times when these
conflicted with men’s liberties. Examples of battles waged at this stage are
ample, such as abolishing the law that protected a (male) citizen’s house
from outer invasion, but left the (female) citizen in it to be physically
invaded against her will;193 laws that enabled men to be excused of murder
charges when claiming an “honor killing” of their wives;194 and laws that
rendered a man eligible for compensation when a woman under his auspice
had a sexual encounter with another man.195
To support this evolutional development, I propose a third stage where
women ask that their rights not only be included, but that once included
their rights would not be re-suspended for any reason. This plea for
sustainable inclusion is aimed at the adjudicative sovereign tacitly declaring
a state of exception for women in response to identifying emergencies
allegedly emanating from a threat to the state. In our case, it is the threat
generated by women’s challenge to conservative and restrictive religious
practices. At this stage, the ability of women to name the suspension of
rights they underwent as a “state of exclusion” weakens, and therefore
requires the kind of reconceptualization and theoretical contextualization
offered by the present article. The cases described here work within a
190

ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN
INDEPENDENT WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 9 (1999).
191
Id. at 15.
192
AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, supra note 174, at 188.
193
Estrich, supra note 152 (the law allowing men to coerce his wife into sexual
intercourse without being perceived as raping her is one outrageous example).
194
Orit Kamir, Honor and Dignity in the Film Unforgiven: Implications for Sociolegal
Theory, 40 L. & SOC. REV. 193, 199 (2006).
195
Sarah Swan, Triangulated Rape, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 403, 410 (2013).
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women-only exception, with these women suffering a very sophisticated
and subtle suspension of their rights. With this in mind, I will now turn to
exploring these peculiarities.
C. Women’s State of Exception: Referral as Suspension
The state of exception Israel faces in the form of its proclaimed state of
emergency allows for a subtle undeclared and normalized suspension of
women’s rights. 196 The exception is expressed and exercised through
suspension tactics as demonstrated in the Israeli get, bus, and voting cases,
even though the courts claimed that women’s rights were not being
denied. 197 Rather, the plaintiff women had asked to choose one of two
recourses available to them or were referred to alternative reliefs within the
legal system.198
While the get case is the epitome of suspension, since the woman was
literally asked to withdraw her tort claim or suffer the suspension of her
divorce claim, the segregation cases, where the women were referred to an
alternative legal route, warrant a more careful analysis. Could such a
referral not be considered legitimate? Arguably, referring a party to utilize
an alternative legal route would be considered fair in some contexts,
including lack of jurisdiction, efficiency, or aptitude in a chosen legal
field. 199 How then should the line be drawn between legitimate and
illegitimate referral? I suggest that an illegitimate Agembenian suspension
is created in circumstances where the referral is done by virtue of the
court’s political reluctance to grant the petitioner her basic legal right.
Suspension occurs where the court has jurisdiction over the case, but
refuses to adjudicate it and in so doing limits the scope of protection
196

See Part IIIB (conceptualizing "suspension" of rights in liberal states).
See Part II (analysis indicating that though the women's rights were acknowledged by
courts, they were nevertheless suspended).
198
Id.
199
Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a
Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547, 1553 (2008).
197
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guaranteed to the petitioner but for the referral. All of the following
circumstances apply in the cases above: (1) the court’s decisions were given
in religious contexts, where political-pragmatism tactics often nurture the
Israeli courts’ reluctance to assist women; (2) the court had clear
jurisdiction over the cases; and (3) the scope of protection of these women’s
rights was indeed limited due to the vertical referral from the constitutional
route to the torts route.
1.

Political Reluctance to Pr otect the Petitioner s
The reluctance of Israeli courts to protect a woman’s right to equality is

deeply

entrenched

and

based

in

political

pragmatism

regarding

discriminatory religious practices. This is especially the case in family and
religious matters. With regard to marriage, Israeli law provides that a
woman in Israel cannot marry outside of the patriarchal domination of her
religion, 200 and there is no civil-marriage institution. 201 There is also the
matter of reproductive rights. While an encompassing discussion of this
issue is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth mentioning that Israeli
law prohibits a married couple from conceiving with the help of a surrogate
mother outside their religion. 202 This prohibition stems from the Israeli
Supreme Court’s recognition of Jewishness as being defined by a
matriarchal lineage rule established in Halakhic law (or more specifically,
its rabbinical orthodox interpretation). 203 Furthermore, an Israeli woman
200

To be clear, this effective ban on inter-religious marriage has been shown to affect
women more than men in Israel. See Zvi H. Triger, The Gendered Racial Formation:
Foreign Men, “Our” Women, and the Law, 30 WOMEN’S RT. L. REP. 479, 503 (2009)
(for an elaboration of this point).
201
Marriage and Divorce Law, 5713-1953 §2, S.H. 134, 186 (Isr.); see SUSAN M. WEISS
& NETTY C. GROSS-HOROWITZ, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN THE JEWISH STATE:
ISRAEL'S CIVIL WAR 2 (2013) (for the implications of having no secular marriage
institution on women).
202
Certification of the Agreement and Status of the Newborn Law, 5756-1996 §2, S.H.
1577, 176 (Isr.).
203
Ayelet Shachar, Citizenship and Membership in Israeli Polity, in FROM MIGRANTS TO
CITIZENS: MEMBERSHIP IN A CHANGING WORLD 188 (Alexis Aleinikoff & Douglas
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who wishes to be a single-parent mother through surrogacy may not do
so—as ruled by the Israeli Supreme Court in New Family v. The Committee
on the Authorization of Agreements Concerning the Carriage of Embryos,
because of the religious issues stemming from having a child from the seed
of a man a woman is not married to.204
The civil courts in general, and the Israeli Supreme Court in particular,
are not ignorant or declaratively indifferent to the difficulties of women
facing their recalcitrant husbands, and at times note their discontent quite
bluntly. In the case of Rephaeli v. Rephaeli, for example, the Grand
Rabbinical Court overturned an order for punitive maintenance on a
recalcitrant husband who was physically abusing his wife as well as being
unfaithful. 205 Consequently, the wife left the house, and the husband,
separated from his wife for over six years, refused to give her a get.206 The
lower rabbinical court based its decision on the violence and infidelity rules
in order to grant the wife punitive damages.207 The Grand Rabbinical Court
later overturned this decision, stating that even assuming violence and
infidelity were proven, there could be no punitive maintenance absent
forewarning.208 It is important to note that in this case the Israel Supreme

Klusmeyer eds., 2000). The implications for non-Jewish women in Israel are even more
absurd, while the imposition of Jewish Law on Jewish women wishing to have a child is
infuriating. The imposition of Jewish rationales to constrain Christian, Muslim, or
nondenominational women wishing to be mothers through surrogacy in Israel borders on
Kafkaesque absurdity.
204
HCJ 2458/01 New Family v. The Comm. on the Authorization of Agreements
Concerning the Carriage of Embryos, PD 57, 419, 468–79 (2001) (Isr.). For the mamzer
status, see supra note 49-50. In his ruling addressing the question of discrimination,
Justice Englard went so far as to say that “[T]he Process of Surrogacy involves the usage
of a stranger’s uterus, and in the case of the unmarried women also the usage of the donor
sperm of a stranger. This state of affairs, we have seen, raises grave moral and Halackhic
problems. . .this is not a matter of equality among equals, this a matter of unsameness
among those who are not the same.” Id. at 479.
205
HCJ 1371/96 Rephaeli v. Rephaeli, PD 51, 198 (1998) (Isr.).
206
Id. at 201.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 202.
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Court, after accepting certiorari, had to decide between two decisions
stemming from Jewish Law—the first from the lower rabbinical court and
the second from the Grand Rabbinical Court. Thus, the Supreme Court was
not even required in its decision to go beyond religious arguments and
address matters concerning the freedom of conscience or the freedom to
remarry in order to grant the woman her relief by reinstating the decision of
the lower rabbinical court. 209 The woman was clearly going through a
quintessential Bare Life experience. Justice Cheshin’s ruling articulated this
when he held that the plaintiff was being treated worse than the biblical
slave looking forward to his sixth year of enslavement, when he would
finally be set free.210 Yet Justice Cheshin, along with his fellow justices,
refused to intervene in the Grand Rabbinical Court’s decision. Claiming
deference to the Grand Rabbinical Court, the Supreme Court as the High
Court of Justice refused to grant a remedy. The court stated that it did not sit
as an appeals instance for factual and Jewish halahkhaic disagreements
among the rabbinical courts, and dismissed the woman’s injunction, thus
deserting her to fend for herself. 211 In doing so, the Supreme Court
disregarded both the plaintiff’s right to equality by upholding her
recalcitrant and abusive husband’s power over her, and her right to
autonomy to be able to bring an end to the marriage and move on with her
life.212 Moreover, based on the politically motivated reluctance to rule over
matters of religious Jewish law and come into conflict with the Grand
Rabbinical Court, the Israeli Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the case
to give a remedy in the interests of justice. 213 The Supreme Court also

209

Id.
Id. (Chechin, J., concurring).
211
Id. at 203.
212
Id.
213
Infra note 228 (indicating that the Israeli High Court of Justice had clear jurisdiction
to adjudicate the cases).
210
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committed here an illegitimate referral when upon dismissing the case
suggesting that the plaintiff could petition the rabbinical court once again.214
Israeli courts’ political pragmatism with regard to discriminatory
religious practices is hardly limited to the private sphere and matters of
family life, but also extends into the public sphere and issues of free
practice of religion and worship in the public sphere. In the Prime Minister
Office Director General v. Hoffman case, the Supreme Court rejected the
petition of the women who demanded permission to pray at the sacred
Wailing Wall of Jerusalem. 215 In its rhetoric, the court affirmed the
women’s right to religious worship including their right to pray and read the
Torah out loud in a manner that was contrary to ultra-orthodox
conventions.216 Ultimately, however, the court refused the women’s demand
to allow them use of the Wailing Wall’s public space designated to women
and went on to order the government to merely designate a separate and
segregated remote worship area so as to not offend the sensitivities of the
other worshippers not accustomed to women praying and reading the Torah
simultaneously.217
2.

J ur isdiction
The Israel Supreme Court serves in the capacity of the High Court of

Justice on the grounds of Article 15(c) as well as 15(d)(2) of the Basic Law:
The Judiciary. This law establishes that the Supreme Court presides as the
High Court of Justice, which may grant injunctions and writs to state
authorities, municipal authorities, and other persons that fulfill public

214
HCJ 1371/96 Rephaeli v. Rephaeli, PD 51, 198 (1998) (Isr.) (¶ 18 in Justice Or’s
ruling).
215
AHCJ 4120/00, Prime Minister Office Dir. Gen. v. Anat Hoffman et al., PD 47, 289
(2003) (Isr.).
216
Id. at 298.
217
Id. at 319; see also Raday, supra note 9, at 86–87 (reviews the Women of the Wall
group's legal battles).
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functions in matters where it sees a necessity to grant a remedy in the
interests of Justice.218
In 1985, even before what is sometimes referred to as the Israeli
Constitutional Revolution, the Israeli Supreme Court made it clear that it
had jurisdiction over the executive and legislative branches in applying
judicial review. 219 Moreover, the Supreme Court in its role as the High
Court of Justice also referred to the concept of applying judicial review to
laws in cases where those laws conflicted with the “the fundamental
principles of Israel’s democratic regime.”220 Following this, in 1992, during
the Constitutional Revolution itself, the Knesset passed the Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty, 221 and the Supreme Court announced the
advent of the Constitutional Revolution, stating that this Basic Law was
nothing short of Israel’s “Bill of Rights.”222 This reasoning enabled judicial
review and imbued the Supreme Court with the authority to invalidate laws,
regardless of their secular or religious nature, that infringe upon the rights
enshrined in the Basic Law.223
Armed with these developments, the Israeli Supreme Court began what is
often referred to as its era of judicial activism.224 The Israeli Supreme Court
issued a string of important decisions to both the executive and legislative
branches, which included ordering municipalities to build facilities with full
218

The Judiciary § 15, 5744-1984, S.H. 1110, 78 (Isr.).
HCJ 620/85 Miari v. Speaker of the Knesset, PD 39(3) 122, 127 (1985) (Isr.).
220
HCJ 142/89 Le'Or Movement v. Speaker of the Knesset, PD 44(3) 529, 554 (1985)
(Isr.).
221
Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, S.H. 1391, 150 (Isr.).
222
Yoav Dotan, The Spillover Effect of Bills of Rights: A Comparative Assessment of the
Impact of a Bill of Rights in Canada and Israel, 53 AM. J. COM. L. 293, 312 (2005).
223
See CA 6821/93 Bank Ha'mizrachi Hameuchad v. Migdal, PD 49(4) 221, 419-27
(1994).
224
To clarify, this term was often used by the HCJ’s critics arguing against this kind of
robust application of substantive justice. See Yoav Dotan, Judicial Accountability in
Israel: The High Court of Justice and the Phenomenon of Judicial Hyperactivism, 8 ISR.
AFF. 87, 87-106 (2002); see Gad Barzilai, Fantasies of Liberalism and Liberal
Jurisprudence: State Law, Politics, and the Israeli Arab-Palestinian Community,
34 ISRAEL L. REV. 425 (2000).
219
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access to disabled people.225 It also ordered the IDF to open Israel Air-Force
recruitment to women.226 It affirmed the rights of homosexuals employed
by a national public transportation company to equal treatment;227 and even
went as far as ordering the government to build a road connecting a
Bedouin village constructed without permits with a school pupils from that
village had trouble getting to.228 All of these interventions were done in the
name of the right to equality and in order to safeguard this right’s
constitutional cogency.229
First, with regard to the Bizchutan case and the issue of protecting
women’s right to political inclusion, the Israeli Supreme Court failed to
fulfill its commitment to ensure Israeli citizens’ political expression. Long
before the Constitutional Revolution, in the monumental Kol-Ha’am v. The
Minister of the Interior PD decision, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that
political free speech is part of an “inner-circle.”230 That is, that political free
speech is the most sacred level of protected speech, so important and vital
to a democratic society’s functioning that it must not be infringed upon.231
Second, in the Bavli v. Grand Rabbinical Court case the High Court of
Justice (HCJ) ruled that religious tribunals were bound by general legal and
constitutional principles as elucidated by either legislation or through case
law bound religious tribunals. 232 This allowed the HCJ to strike down
decisions made by the Grand Rabbinical Court in case these decisions

225

HCJ 7081/93 Botzer v. The Local Council of Maccabim-Re'ut, PD 50, 19, 27 (1996)
(Isr.).
226
HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Defence, PD 43, 49 (1995) (Isr.).
227
HCJ 721/94 El-Al v. Danilovitch, PD 48(5) 749, 773 (1994) (Isr.).
228
HCJ 3511/02 The Ass’n "The Forum for Cohabitation in the Negev" v. The Ministry
of Infrastructure, PD 27(2) 102, 107 (2003) (Isr.).
229
HCJ 721/94 El-Al v. Danilovitch, PD 48(5) 749, 760 (1994) (Isr.).
230
HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha'am v. The Minister of the Interior PD 7(2), 871, 878 (1953) (Isr.).
231
Id.; see also Pnina Lahav, American Influence on Israel's Jurisprudence of Free
Speech, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 21, 66 (1982) (for elaboration on the freedom of
political speech).
232
HCJ 1000/92 Bavli v. Grand Rabbinical Court, PD 48(2) 221, 240 (1994) (Isr.).
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infringed upon the constitutional rights of petitioning women. 233 In the
Regan case, the illegality of segregating women from men was professed
through some of Israel’s constitutive laws.234 First, this illegality is present
within Israel’s Declaration of Establishment, which states, “The state of
Israel. . .will ensure complete equality. . .irrespective of. . .sex.”235 Second,
the Women’s Equality Act of 1951 provides that “Women and men shall be
equal for purposes of every legal act.”236
Indeed, examples exist where these principles guided the Supreme Court
in its capacity as the HCJ to substantively, as opposed to only declaratively,
prefer these principles over religious values in the public sphere. In the
Shakdiel v. Minister for Religious Affairs case, the Ministry for Religious
Affairs refused to appoint a woman to a local religious services council.237
In the Poraz v. Mayer of Tel Aviv case, the municipal council of Tel Aviv
refused to appoint a woman to the nominating board for the Tel Aviv
municipal rabbi.238 In both cases, the defendants argued that under Jewish
Law women may not sit on electoral committees or hold public office.239
The Israeli Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that these were
statutory public institutions, and that the women plaintiffs had a
fundamental right to equality, thus obligating the institutions to accept
female members.240
233

Id.
See HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transp., PD 48(2) 221, 240 (1994) (Isr.).
235
Jewish People’s Council, Declaration of the Establishment of State of Israel of 14 May
1948, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20
establishment%20of%20state%20of%20israel.aspx.
236
Equal Rights For Women Law, 5711-1951, 1A(a), translated at
http://financeisrael.mof.gov.il/FinanceIsrael/Docs/En/legislation/LaborSocialPolicy/5711
-1951_Equal_Rights_for_Women_Law.pdf.
237
HCJ 153/87 Shakdiel v. Minister for Religious Affairs 42(2) PD 221, 228 (1987)
(Isr.).
238
HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel Aviv 42(2) PD 309, 318 (1987) (Isr.).
239
HCJ 153/87, Shakdiel v. Minister for Religious Affairs 42(2) PD 221, 234 (1987)
(Isr.); HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel Aviv 42(2) PD 309, 322 (1987) (Isr.).
240
HCJ 153/87, Shakdiel v. Minister for Religious Affairs 42(2) PD 221, 274 (1987)
(Isr.); HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel Aviv 42(2) PD 309, 329 (1987) (Isr.).
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3.

Limiting Ver tical Refer r al
Referring a petition based on violation of constitutional rights claim to

the tort route is vertical referral; this section introduces the vertical nature of
the referral by delineating the hierarchy between the constitutional route and
the tort route, and it then moves to present three arguments against vertical
referral.
The tort and constitutional routes differ so much from each other that it
seems almost unnecessary, and to some extent impossible, to compare the
scopes of protection they offer to women’s right to equality. Our intuitive
recognition that constitutional protection is far more preferable to women
needs

only

little

explanation.

The

distinctive,

rudimentary,

and

quintessential elements of each of these legal fields places these fields in a
clear hierarchical structure in which constitutional protection is dominant.241
It is certainly possible to argue that the referral of a matter of significant
public hu(wo)man interest from the constitutional to the tort route is a
downgrading referral, since it causes the claims in question to become
depoliticized and weakened in several important ways.
First, the claims undergo a definitional transformation. When a matter
becomes the subject of a tort claim, it transforms from a matter of public
importance to one of a private nature.242 In other words, this is a situation
where the court essentially privatizes a public problem. The idea behind
using torts to affect public change is promulgated by the concept of the
plaintiff operating as a kind of private attorney general who exacts a
monetary cost on the undesirable behavior and thus deters potential
defendants from carrying out this behavior in the future. 243 While this
approach of transforming a public matter into a private claim in tort may
241
CA 6821/93 Bank Ha'mizrachi Hameuchad v. Migdal, PD 49(4) 221, 292-319, 353
(1994).
242
ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 70–71, 74 (1995).
243
See John Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV., 917,
946–47 (2010) (for the similarity between a prosecutor and a tort claimant); see John C.P.
Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 548 (2003) (for deterrence).

VOLUME 14 • ISSUE 3 • 2016

715

716 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

seem benign and morally neutral, it is important to stress that this model of
deterrence, by using private plaintiffs, exists alongside a theory of economic
efficiency. In this theory, the plaintiff, rather than the state, is trying to
create deterrence through a civil claim that is actually rather conservative.244
For example, by referring the case to the tort route, the Supreme Court is
actually telling the segregated-bus plaintiffs that under economic efficiency
theory, the cheapest agents to prevent245 the harm caused by discriminatory
segregation are the women themselves.246 Rather, the Israeli Supreme Court
should have identified itself as the cheapest cost avoider, one that can
prohibit the segregating policy altogether and prevent it ex ante.247 This is
only true, of course, under the artificial premise that the court is just a
neutral arbiter in private law, not a guardian of the disenfranchised as it
rhetorically sees itself in the public constitutional context.248 This kind of
neutrality, typical to tort disputes,249 tends to preserve existing interests that
are vested in the preservation of the status quo of power disparity between
the plaintiff women and the particular tortfeasor.250
Second, the referral is not only detrimental to the plaintiffs, but also puts
judges of lower instances (i.e., magistrates and district court judges)
deciding the tort cases in a complicated position. On the one hand, the
244

James R. Hackney, Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics: Science, Politics, and the
Reconfiguration of American Tort Law Theory, 15 L. & HIST. REV. 275, 314–15 (1997).
245
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 67 (1970).
246
Yoav Dotan, Judicial Rhetoric, Government Lawyers, and Human Rights: The Case of
the Israeli High Court of Justice during the Intifada, 33 L. & SOC’Y REV., 319, 320
(1999) (argues that courts use either rhetoric or settlement tactics to protect human
rights).
247
See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972) (for the cheapest cost avoider of the harm principle).
248
See HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transp., PD 64, 530, 552-554 (2008) (Isr.).
249
Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on The Liability Crisis, Mass Torts,
Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 853 (1990) (criticizing the alleged
neutrality of courts to tort dispute parties, since tort law actually benefits hegemonic
parties to a tort dispute).
250
Russel Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 608, 625 (1998).
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Supreme Court has referred the plaintiffs to these courts to seek a remedy
on torts; on the other hand, by dismissing the petitions the Supreme Court is
seen as giving these practices a constitutional seal of approval, which makes
it difficult for the plaintiffs to prove the harm element that is necessary for
their tort suit to be successful. Therefore, the judges of the lower instances
deciding these tort cases face the need to decide upon a tort claim for
discrimination regarding an act that the Supreme Court just deemed
constitutional and compatible with equality. For example, consider the
public segregation ordeal where the Supreme Court’s decision created a
dichotomy in which the practice is either consensual—and thus legal, as far
as the bus company is concerned—or coerced, and hence presumed to be
the act of a private overzealous individual who should in turn be sued for
damages. 251 Indeed, this problem manifested in a suit where the plaintiff
included the transportation company in her plea, and the latter asked for
immunity due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Regan and based on
“national aspects.” 252 This contention of the transportation company, that
their allegedly wrongful actions were rendered illegitimate in public legal
venues, illustrates how constitutional issues of public relevance are more
suitable to resolving the case. The civil district judge who reviewed the
Bizchutan case overtly raised this concern and the uneasiness it causes to
low-instance civil court judges. That judge opined that the case touched
upon fundamental basic rights such as the right to equality, the right to be

251
Essentially, under Regan, as long as the public transportation companies refrain from
coercing segregation directly through their employees, or through instructions ordering
passengers to sit in segregated areas, they would be virtually immune to any tort claim by
a woman, even one who was coerced to comply with the segregated practice.
252
CA 2356/08 Yasur Ruth Ray v. Egged, *1, *7–*13 (2014) (Isr.) (This case featured a
class action suit against a public transportation company operating an inter-city
segregated bus line. Although the claim for immunity was eventually rejected by the
court, the judge still invoked a rationale for it that would go beyond identifying the
discriminatory practice as being illegal in and of itself.).
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elected, which he deemed of crucial weight, and the rights that go beyond
his jurisdiction.253
Thirdly, such referrals to the lower courts via the tort route are not
without practical, and sometimes significant, financial consequences for the
plaintiffs, since pursuing tort claims demands the investment of
considerable resources by the women plaintiffs. 254 Finally, the referral
creates a mechanism that only becomes relevant after the fact, but creates
no direct ex ante protections against the harm inflicted in the first place.255
Thus, we see that much like the veritable power Agamben identified in
his work, the power embedded in the decision to refer by way of suspension
can render “power” to women, while at the same time render these women
“powerless.”256

IV. TORT LAW SHOULD COMPLEMENT OTHER HU(WO)MAN RIGHTS
LAWS
The notion of tort law as a tool for enhancing human rights has recently
emerged by theorists advocating its role in pursuing equalities, even within
its traditional corrective-justice paradigm.257 However, these theories do not
engage with the type of challenge presented in this article. This challenge
relates to a constellation whereby tort law is measured against another legal
tool as potential and alternative protector of human rights. This
constellation constitutes a more direct challenge to the disposition of tort

253

TBC 17/20 Bizchutan v. Yom L'Yom, *1, *16-17 (2015) (Isr.).
Normally in Israel, court fees for a civil suit amount to 2.5 percent of the total sum
sought by the plaintiff for compensation, as stipulated in Article 6 of the Court
Regulations. Court Regulations (Fees), 2007, KT 6579 p. 720 (Isr.). Attorney fees are
also paid in advance. Id.
255
Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in
Hindsight, 19 L. & HUMAN BEHAV. 89, 89-92 (1995).
256
Geraldine Pratt, Abandoned Women and Spaces of the Exception, 37 ANTIPODE 1052,
1062 (2005).
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Michael E. Schrader, Competition and Convenience: The Emerging Role of
Community Reinvestment, 67 IND. L.J. 347, 359 (1992).
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law in relation to other legal branches of law available to wage the struggle
to secure the hu(wo)man right to equality.258
To this end, a theory regarding the relations between tort law and
constitutional law in contexts of overlapping relevance is what is at stake.
The tort route and the constitutional route can operate in either a
complementary, that is, in addition to the use of tort claims, or a mutually
exclusive way, that is, one employing suspension of the constitutional right.
Under the notion of complementarity, constitutional law acts as the
metaphoric shield by protecting women’s rights, while tort law acts as the
metaphoric sword by allowing women to receive compensation for
violations of those rights. The plaintiff can then make a strategic choice
with regard to how both routes may be deployable at the same time. If she is
being suppressed, excluded, and placed at a great power disadvantage, then
the plaintiff may want to use the “shield,” that is, the constitutional route to
nullify or diminish the harm done to her. If, on the other hand, she has more
time and wishes to be more precise against the particular actor causing her
the harm, she may choose to use the sword, that is, the torts route. These
actions might seem sequential, but they are not. In keeping with the
metaphor, they are means in combat to be used in the order and frequency
of the plaintiff’s choosing, always available to her and always
complementary. The complementarity of tort law encapsulated in its
synchronic usability, along with other available legal redresses, puts the
injured plaintiff at the forefront, allowing her the legal choice she deserves,
as the person whose rights were abridged. 259 This empowerment is
specifically essential to women because in the third stage of the
evolutionary development articulated in this article, women plaintiffs find
258
Beth Stephens, Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human Rights Through Domestic
Litigation, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 401, 408 (2001).
259
In this respect, the complementary way lies at the heart of what can be referred to as
Social Justice Theory of Tort Law. This theory, in a nutshell, advocates the importance of
using tort law as a means to promote a women’s own sentiments as to social matters.
Goldberg, supra note 246, at 561.
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themselves mid-battle, suddenly told that the normal rules have been
suspended, and they must now choose between sword and shield to sustain
their human rights.
Vulnerability theory to torts, developed and advocated elsewhere, would
support the complementarity solution. Moreover, this theory would
advocate its application to an extent that goes beyond even the
constitutional-tort interplay towards diverse fields of law that may overlap
with tort law regarding to women’s basic rights. 260 Torts vulnerability
theory is premised on the idea that tort law should serve to eliminate
abusive social power relations and compensate victims for these relations’
inferred harms. The theory advocates the compensation of those parties who
sustained their harms through their tortfeasors’ abuse of the power relations
within which the parties interact.261 Untraditional as it is, this theory draws
on the notion of “reciprocity” introduced in George Fletcher’s well-known
and accepted theory of tort law. Reciprocity focuses tort liability on the
degree of risk that the parties in a lawsuit impose on each other, advocating
the imposition of liability only when the risk taken by the tortfeasor against
the victim exceeds the degree of risk normally inflicted by people in
society, that is, non-reciprocal risk.262 Fletcher submits that this perception
of unwanted risk-taking offers better protection of individual interests than
the paradigm of reasonableness, which assigns liability based on a
utilitarian calculus. 263 This social understanding is what justifies the
imposition of tort liability in cases where the tortfeasor inflicts harm on the
victim through the exercise of a risk that is not reciprocal in nature, or risk

260

ASHER FLYNN, NICOLA HENRY & ANASTASIA POWELL, RAPE JUSTICE: BEYOND THE
CRIMINAL LAW 112 (2015).
261
Bitton, supra note 10, at 246.
262
Id. at 541.
263
George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 541548 (1972).
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that despite being “reciprocal” was not reasonably executed, and therefore
constitutes negligent behavior.264
Pursuant to Fletcher’s ideas, vulnerability theory identifies discrimination
with nonreciprocal risks and maintains that negligence law should serve to
impose liability on tortfeasors vis-à-vis victims of their discriminatory
acts.265 The power relations existing between the rival parties are rendered
nonreciprocal, and whenever the abuse of these relations triggers dispute,
vulnerability theory calls for the imposition of liability on the victim's
abuser.266 This theory’s main concern, in accordance with the liberal stance
on basic liberties, lies with power relations characterized as “suspect,” that
is, as reflecting “old and bad” discriminatory relationships based on race,
sex, religion, and disability. 267 Such power relations lie at the heart of
heinous social structures that endanger the wholesomeness of democracy,
and therefore justify the harnessing of the tort-law mechanism for
protecting society against the harm inflicted upon it.268
Although vulnerability theory brings into account the general social
structure within which power relations might render a discriminatory
behavior “non-reciprocal,” vulnerability theory still remains within the
bounds of the bilateral dispute splitting the parties.269 In light of this fact,
this theory is especially suitable for accommodating the challenge that
suspension poses to women’s rights. Due to its focus on power relations, it
would point to the harms inflicted upon the women in the cases presented
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Bitton, supra note 44, at 162–72.
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Bitton, supra note 10, at 246.
267
Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 963
(1984).
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Note that power relations as a catalyst for an activist-strategic use of tort law is known
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relations, employer-employee relations, etc. Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the
Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1749–
1752 (1981).
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above as representing exactly the kind of abuse imposed on women within
the social context of the systemic inferiority they bear in relation to men.270
The imposition of tort liability in such circumstances, as the cases presented
above indicate, is not only allowed but also imperative. Thus, vulnerability
theory dictates a transformative opposite reaction in the way tort law
functions in these situations, where women are deprived of their
constitutional right to equality. The basic idea of tort liability here—
securing equality in a reality of power relations271—would be frustrated by
suspending rather than complementing other means for protecting
hu(wo)men’s rights.
The Nilly Philip v. Municipality of Beit-Shemesh case provides a great
example of the complementary nature of tort law when a tort suit is being
used to compensate women for deprivation of equality as an alternative to
the administrative branch’s failure to protect them. In Nilly Philip, the
women plaintiffs filed a tort action against their municipality claiming
damages for the harm they sustained as a result of public advertisements
ordering women in the city to be modest while walking the city’s streets.272
The signage, addressing women alone, stipulated that “[w]omen
visiting/working/shopping in our neighborhood are required to respect the
sentiments of our residents, who are faithful to God and his Torah and
ARRIVE in MODEST DRESS, which includes: buttoned up, long sleeved
blouse , long skirt – no pants allowed – not wearing tight or see-through
garments” (bold caps in the original). 273 Another sign was more bluntly
phrased and aimed, as I have claimed before, to abolish any female presence
in the city streets: “Women are requested to REFRAIN FROM
PASSING/PAUSING BY THIS SIDE WALK” (bold caps in the
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Bitton, supra note 44, at 131.
Id. at 159–72.
272
CA 41269-02-13 Nilly Philip v. Municipality of Beit-Shemesh (Isr.) (case has not
been published as of 2015).
273
Id. ¶ 13.
271

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Suspension, Hu(wo)man Rights and Torts

original).274 The women-plaintiffs brought their claim under the negligence
tort, 275 and the court’s elegant and clear analysis showcases tort law’s
potential as yet another tool in fighting sex discrimination given the colossal
failure of the public entities, such as the police and the municipality, to
protect women’s right to equality and human dignity.276 The court used its
decision to enumerate the public entities’ failure as well as to establish their
negligent behavior, that is, their failure to act reasonably, as expected from
a public entity committed to equality. A reasonable response to the
abridgement of the plaintiffs’ right to equality, the court submitted, would
have been to act swiftly to ensure the removal of the signage as well as
assure that the women are not accosted and are not required to follow the
instructions the signage contained.277
The court suggested a public-private disposition, which accords with a
complementary rather than suspension approach. It offers to use tort law as
a means of protecting women’s rights where the public system has not done
so itself. 278 According to the court, the women repeatedly sought the
protection of the municipality and the police against the atmosphere of
274
Both signs were depicted in the court’s decision, and were brought as examples of
many other such signs placed across the city. Id. ¶ 11, 17.
275
Tort Ordinance §35 [New Version], 1968, 10 LSI 266 [New Version].
276
CA, 41269-02-13, Nilly Philip v. Municipality of Beit-Shemesh (Isr.), ¶ 69 (case has
not been published as of 2015).
277
Id. ¶ . As dictated by the “reasonable person” standard. Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc.,
510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). As stated by Justice O’Connor, “This standard, which we
reaffirm today, takes a middle path between making actionable any conduct that is merely
offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury. As we
pointed out in Meritor, mere utterance of an. . .epithet which engenders offensive feelings
in an employee. . .does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to implicate
Title VII. Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile
or abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview.” Id. at 21 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see generally Barbara A. Gutek et al., The Utility of The Reasonable Woman
Legal Standard in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Cases A Multimethod,
Multistudy Examination, 5 PSYCH., PUBLIC POL’Y, & L. 596 (1999) (discussing the need
to deploy the reasonability test from a feminine standpoint).
278
HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transp., PD 64, 530, 563 (2008) (Isr.).
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discrimination, intimidation, and humiliation suffered as a result of that
misogynic signage.279 The plaintiff’s complaints about incidents of bigotry
and assault were not treated properly,280 and their sense of being constantly
under threat in the public sphere grew stronger. 281 Ultimately, the signs
were kept mostly intact, and in the few cases where they were actually
removed, ultra-orthodox men quickly reinstated them without any proper
reaction by the authorities.282
Interestingly, the police and the municipality declared that they were
taking measures to resolve the situation by trying to negotiate with the ultraorthodox community, and the court did not use these facts to stall tort
proceedings. 283 Rather, the court pointed to the authorities themselves as
those who violated the women’s right to protection, thereby rejecting the
authorities’ submission that trying to resolve the issue through negotiation
had justified the violation of the women’s rights and the authorities’ own
unreasonable behavior as tortfeasors. 284 This critical judgment granted
against the police and the municipality further underlined the court’s
assessment of the harm sustained by the women.
[T]he defendants’ behavior. . .suffices to contribute to the
plaintiffs’ emotional distress and to add another layer to it. Beyond
the insult and harm, it brings about. . .a heavy realization that the
authorized public entities had deserted the plaintiffs and women as
a whole in allowing the ongoing violation of their rights, and were
prepared to allow a reality in which parts of the city were not
subjected to the rule of law in a manner that may be interpreted as
an acceptance of this state of affairs. . .this behavior and disregard
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CA 41269-02-13 Nilly Philip v. Municipality of Beit-Shemesh, *1, *17 (Isr.).
Id.
281
Id.
282
Id. at *14.
283
Id.
284
Id. at *10–16 (establishing the duty of care as well as recognizing the negligent
behavior in the way the authorities dragged their feet in reaction to the plaintiffs'
complaints).
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[for women’s rights] aggravated their sense of insult and
vulnerability.285
These court's harsh words, originally aimed at the executive entities, are
also applicable to the judiciary itself as was presented in the cases discussed
in this paper. The judges who decided the Regan and Bizchutan cases, and
used tort claims for suspending women’s rights, acted with striking
similarity to the court in the above description.286 Regardless of the court’s
good intentions in availing women the tortious route and using it in a
revolutionary fashion to protect their human rights, the court brought about
a destructive result where tortious claims were used for suspending
women’s rights. Women’s claims under tort law should thus function as an
addition to protecting their rights, and not as a mere substitute for their
rights. Tortious rights should complement and deepen the protection
provided to human rights by constitutional law and public entities, rather
than rendering these remedies mutually exclusive. Complementarity
facilitates a comprehensive and holistic legal system committed to the
protection and advancement of human rights.

V. CONCLUSION
Despite the tremendous role tort law is gradually assuming in waging the
fight to protect human rights by using as many legal tools as possible, this
positive trend also bears some dangerous implications. After a decade of
women using tort claims in creative manners that clearly benefitted women
and bettered their inferior social as well as legal status, these same claims
are now turning into a mutually exclusive alternative, a substitute, rather
than an independent and additional tool for bolstering women’s rights.
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Id. at *18.
See HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transp., PD 64, 530, 568-70 (2008) (Isr.)
(deciding not to grant the women their requested legal relief); see also TBC 17/20
Bizchutan v. Yom L'Yom, *1, *4–5 (2015) (Isr.) (stating that the women need to use
another venue, though they hold a meritorious claim).

286

VOLUME 14 • ISSUE 3 • 2016

725

726 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

The destructive turn that created the suspension, and thus made tort and
constitutional remedies mutually exclusive, was at times an explicit effort to
block women from reclaiming equality where it was taken away from them,
as in the get cases brought before the rabbinical courts.287 At other times,
like in the Regan and Bizchutan cases, referral to tort law was made as an
effort aimed at equipping women with another tool to assist them in gaining
redress through the private legal sphere. 288 In both methodologies, a
worrying similar effect emerged, one that suspends women’s basic rights
and privatizes their right to redress in the public sphere too. As Agamben’s
political philosophy suggests, this trend places women in a state of
exception where their rights are violated by the liberal state in which the
rule of law should allegedly prevail.289 Women’s experience in the added
third stage adds a more nuanced perspective to Agamben’s theory,
contextualizing it and pointing to the peculiar and more harmful manner in
which the theory applies to women.290 Taking away their right to choose
between a civil lawsuit and a constitutional claim, by suspending their right
to pursue one of these paths and the forced privatization of their public
struggle, burdens women with the role of being the private general attorneys
and executors of the basic rights that the state should have secured for them.
Although this trend is identified as taking place in the Israeli legal
system, it also bears implications for many other common law systems. The
suspension of women’s rights and their privatization by the liberal state as a
pragmatic political response is expected to prosper. This article should serve
as a warning sign to this trend worldwide.
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See supra notes 54-70 and accompanying text (reviewing the suspension of women's
rights within the get ordeal in Rabbinical courts).
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See HCJ 746/07 Regan v. Ministry of Transp., PD 64, 530, 562-63 (2008) (Isr.); see
also TBC 17/20 Bizchutan v. Yom L'Yom, *1, *4 (2015) (Isr.).
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See supra Part III (utilizing Agamben's philosophy to conceptualize modern
suspension of hu(wo)man rights).
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